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Abstract 
Given the significant growth of the Internet in recent years, marketers have been 
striving for new techniques and strategies to prosper in the online world. Statistically, 
search engines have been the most dominant channels of Internet marketing in recent 
years. However, the mechanics of advertising in such a market place has created a 
challenging environment for marketers to position their ads among their competitors. 
This study uses a unique cross-sectional dataset of the top 500 Internet retailers in North 
America and hierarchical multiple regression analysis to empirically investigate the effect 
of keyword competition on the relationship between ad position and its determinants in 
the sponsored search market. To this end, the study utilizes the literature in consumer 
search behavior, keyword auction mechanism design, and search advertising performance 
as the theoretical foundation.  
This study is the first of its kind to examine the sponsored search market 
characteristics in a cross-sectional setting where the level of keyword competition is 
explicitly captured in terms of the number of Internet retailers competing for similar 
keywords.  Internet retailing provides an appropriate setting for this study given the high-
stake battle for market share and intense competition for keywords in the sponsored 
search market place. The findings of this study indicate that bid values and ad relevancy 
metrics as well as their interaction affect the position of ads on the search engine result 
pages (SERPs). These results confirm some of the findings from previous studies that 
examined sponsored search advertising performance at a keyword level. Furthermore, the 
study finds that the position of ads for web-only retailers is dependent on bid values and 
ad relevancy metrics, whereas, multi-channel retailers are more reliant on their bid 
 
viii 
values. This difference between web-only and multi-channel retailers is also observed in 
the moderating effect of keyword competition on the relationships between ad position 
and its key determinants. Specifically, this study finds that keyword competition has 
significant moderating effect only for multi-channel retailers. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1  Introduction 
The rapid growth of the Internet over the past two decades has raised significant interest 
among advertisers in using it as a tool for conveying their messages. The Internet has 
enabled the distribution of information to be affordable, convenient, and remarkably fast. 
Search engines in particular have been shown to be the primary gateway for most Internet 
users seeking information (Jansen & Mullen, 2008). This growth of users, along with 
simple, targeted, and customizable advertising, has allowed search engines to be the 
dominant online marketing channel on the Internet. In 2010, the revenue generated in the 
North American search engine marketing industry was $16.6B1 (Econsultancy, 2011). 
Given the unique characteristics that advertisers encounter in this growing online 
marketplace (e.g., three-agent interaction2, mounting competition, and increasing budget 
allocation), it is evident that advertisers must understand the search engine environment 
to develop competitive strategies to achieve their marketing goals. Not only is the display 
of an advertisement directly related to the marketing goals, but so is the position of the ad 
within the search engine result pages (SERPs). Whether the marketing goal is brand 
awareness (visibility), revenue maximization (profit), or lead generation (visits), 
advertisers need to understand the factors that affect the display and position of ads in the 
sponsored search marketplace and develop strategies to compete in such a marketplace.  
In sponsored search advertising, firms create ads and link them to keywords in 
order to appear on the SERPs. When a searcher enters a keyword, the search engine 
                                                
1 Values are in US dollars. 
2 Search engines, advertisers and users. 
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retrieves the ads related to that keyword (if any) and displays the ad on the resulting 
search page. The displayed ads are called ad copies and they usually contain a title, a 
short description, and a URL linking to the advertiser’s destination webpage. Whenever a 
user clicks on the ad copy, the advertiser will be charged according to a payment 
mechanism called Pay-Per-Click (Geddes, 2010). Unlike conventional advertising media, 
where ad slots usually have predetermined prices, search engines conduct auctions in 
order to allocate ad slots to advertisers. Advertisers bid on keywords (or group of 
keywords) to enter these auctions. Winning an auction means that the ad linked to a 
keyword will be displayed on the SERP.  
With improvements in search engines’ ad placement mechanisms, the bidding 
value is no longer the only winning criteria in sponsored search auctions. The displayed 
ads should also be relevant to the searcher’s query. Viewing pertinent ads is a vital factor 
for consumers searching online (Jansen & Spink, 2009) and the display of relevant ads 
(results) on the SERP attracts more customers to the search engine. Consequently, more 
users would click on the sponsored ads and this will generate higher revenue for the 
search engines. Therefore, search engines have employed mechanisms that rank ads not 
only based on bidding values but also on how relevant the ads are to the users’ queries 
(Lahaie, 2006; Liu & Chen, 2006). For example, Google uses a measure called Quality 
Score (Google, 2011b) to determine whether an ad is eligible (relevant) to enter the 
auction as well as to determine where to place the advertiser’s ad on the SERP3. 
                                                
3 Although Google is referenced throughout the rest of this thesis (due to its dominance in 
search engine market share), other search engines are also using similar approaches in their 
auction design. Yahoo! uses a measure called Quality Index and Microsoft Bing is also 
incorporating quality measures in its ranking mechanism. 
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Therefore, advertisers should not only implement a proper bidding strategy, but also 
consider the ad relevancy measures needed to optimize their ad campaigns. 
From the mechanism design viewpoint, competition is an inevitable characteristic 
of any auction design (Brannman, Klein, & Weiss, 1987; Milgrom & Weber, 1982). To 
succeed in sponsored search advertising, it is crucial for advertisers to understand the 
impact of competition in the underlying auction design. Major search engine providers 
currently use Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction. To succeed in a GSP auction, 
advertisers need to implement proper strategies to compete with their rivals. Auctions are 
generally explained by game theory, which mathematically models situations where the 
decision of each individual influences others’ welfare (Myerson, 1997). In any auction 
game, there might be a situation called “strategic dominance”, where for each individual 
there is a decision that results in a best strategy independent of others’ decisions. 
However, the GSP auction does not have equilibrium in dominant strategies (Edelman, 
Ostrovsky, & Schwarz, 2005; Varian, 2007). Therefore, the decision of each advertiser is 
dependent on the decision of its rivals. With no dominant strategy in GSP auction, the 
number of competitors participating in the sponsored search advertising could have a 
significant impact on the allocation of ad slots to competing advertisers. 
Two major streams of research have studied sponsored search advertising. While 
some researchers have focused on the auction process and investigated the mechanism 
design of such a market, others have focused on empirically modeling sponsored search 
ad performance using different performance variables. Studies related to auction 
mechanism design use game theory and impose restrictions on the real world situation to 
explain the market place and the interaction between agents of the marketplace 
Introduction  
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(Aggarwal, Feldman, & Muthukrishnan, 2007; Aggarwal, Goel, & Motwani, 2006; 
Asdemir, 2006; Edelman et al., 2005; Varian, 2007). This stream has been followed by 
other researchers who propose new slot allocation mechanisms in the sponsored search 
mechanism design (Edelman & Schwarz, 2007; Feng, Bhargava, & Pennock, 2007; 
Lahaie, 2006; Liu & Chen, 2006). The other stream of research analyzes sponsored 
search market place using keyword level or firm level data. This stream is mostly related 
to advertising strategies and optimization of keyword bidding values (Ghose & Yang, 
2008, 2009, 2010; Rutz & Bucklin, 2007, 2011; Skiera, Eckert, & Hinz, 2010). Other 
related empirical studies have investigated consumer search behavior in sponsored search 
markets (e.g., Jansen, Booth, & Spink, 2008; Jansen & Resnick, 2006; Jansen & Spink, 
2009). 
Yet existing research in sponsored search advertising has failed to incorporate 
certain essential ingredients when modeling such marketplaces. The most neglected 
characteristic of the sponsored search market is competition intensity (Animesh, 
Viswanathan, & Agarwal, 2011; Ghose & Yang, 2009; Rutz & Bucklin, 2007). This is 
primarily due to a lack of cross-sectional competition data, the uncertainty about the 
underlying proprietary ad placement algorithms, and the heterogeneous characteristics of 
auction markets. Previous empirical research has indicated that the position of the ads on 
the SERP has significant importance in measuring economic or behavioral performance 
metrics (Dou, Lim, Su, Zhou, & Cui, 2010; Ganchev et al., 2007; Jansen et al., 2008; 
Rutz & Bucklin, 2007). However, there has been very limited research that examines the 
effect of competition intensity in the keyword market. Furthermore, while positioning 
strategy has been the subject of study in other competitive markets (Ahmed, 1991; 
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Brooksbank, 1994; Shostack, 1987), previous empirical studies in sponsored search 
advertising have rarely analyzed ad position as a dependent variable. 
This study investigates the effect of keyword competition on the determinants of 
sponsored search ad position in an Internet retailing setting. Given that Internet retailers 
are at the very end of the supply chain, the development of information technology has 
enabled them to develop new marketing strategies in their advertising campaigns. 
Utilizing this new form of advertising with its growing consumer exposure enables 
retailers to expand their market share. Therefore, in this thesis, I plan to empirically 
examine the effect of keyword competition on a unique cross-sectional dataset using 
hierarchical multiple regression analysis (Aiken & West, 1991; Montgomery, Peck, 
Vining, & Vining, 2001). Specifically, I address two related research questions. First, 
how do key sponsored search variables (e.g., bid value, ad relevancy factors) affect ad 
position? Second, how does competition intensity moderate the relationship between ad 
position and its key determinants? To address these questions, I also control market 
conditions to account for differences across merchant types, company sizes, advertising 
budgets, and search engine optimization (SEO) quality in Internet retailing. 
1.2  Research Goals and Contributions 
Bidding in keyword auctions, ad relevancy measures, and intense keyword competition 
create a very challenging environment for Internet retailers in sponsored search 
advertising. Bidding values are easily measurable determinants of ad position, and 
usually in the control of advertisers. However, the relevancy of the advertisement to the 
user query is determined by multiple factors, which are proprietary to search engines. My 
objective in this study is to analyze the determinants of ad position, and empirically 
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examine how the level of keyword competition affects the relationship between ad 
position and its key determinants in the sponsored search market. 
My research provides guidelines for researchers and practitioners with respect to 
the determinants of sponsored ad position in a competitive setting. From an academic 
perspective, this thesis attempts to explain how bidding strategy affects ad position, the 
relationship between ad relevancy attributes and ad position, and how these relationships 
are affected by the level of competition in the marketplace, using a unique cross-sectional 
dataset of online retailers and their search advertising campaigns. From the practitioners’ 
perspective, the results of this study may enable advertisers to better implement 
positioning and differentiation strategies on the SERPs. With the widespread acceptance 
and use of search engines, advertisers are heavily investing in sponsored search 
advertising. Whether the advertisers’ goal is brand awareness or revenue maximization, 
advertisers are well aware that the position of ads has a direct effect on their marketing 
goals. In particular, knowing that consumers click on sponsored ads based on their 
position on the SERP, the results of this study can guide advertisers in their campaign 
strategies in order to appear in the desired ad positions.  
1.3  Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the literature in Internet marketing and sponsored 
search advertising. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework and the theoretical 
foundations. Chapter 4 outlines the research model and the hypotheses of this study. 
Chapter 5 describes the data collection procedure, the research methodology, and the 
empirical results of the study. Chapter 6 presents the discussion of the results and the 
Introduction  
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theoretical and practical implications of the study. Finally, Chapter 7 provides the 
conclusions, limitations, and future research directions.  
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 2  Background and Research Context 
2.1  Internet Marketing 
Internet marketing, also known as online advertising, is a relatively modern marketing 
technique in comparison to conventional marketing channels like newspapers, radio, and 
television. It origins back to the early 1990s, when product information was displayed on 
simple text-based websites. With advances in information technologies, other forms of 
Internet marketing such as affiliate marketing, e-mail marketing, banner advertising, and 
search engine marketing (SEM) have emerged. 
Affiliate marketing, also known as associate marketing, is a strategic marketing 
scheme with three roles involved in it: merchants, affiliates, and consumers (Duffy, 
2005). The mechanics are very simple: the affiliate takes the risk of marketing costs for 
promoting the merchant’s products or services in order to redirect consumers to the 
merchant’s shopping portals. In return, the merchant pays a percentage of the sales from 
the redirected consumer as a reward to the affiliate (pay-per-conversion) or the affiliate 
gets rewarded as it redirects a certain number of consumers to the merchant website (pay-
per-lead) (Libai, Biyalogorsky, & Gerstner, 2003). Although affiliate marketing provides 
a win-win situation for both merchants and affiliates, partners should be chosen carefully 
to be relevant to the website content (for affiliates) (Gallaugher, Auger, & BarNir, 2001) 
and to redirect more consumers to shopping portals (for merchants) (Chaffey, Ellis-
Chadwick, Mayer, & Johnston, 2009). 
Email marketing is another form of Internet advertising, which uses email to 
promote products or services to consumers. A 2011 report by Pew Research Center 
Background and Research Context  
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(Purcell, 2011) shows that over 90% of Internet users are using email with 61% using it 
every day. Cheaper advertising costs, faster consumer response time, and interaction with 
consumers are the primary reasons for the popularity of this advertising medium (Martin, 
Van Durme, Raulas, & Merisavo, 2003). Furthermore, marketers believe that email is 
among the dominant virtual mechanisms of viral marketing (word-of-mouth advertising) 
(Phelps, Lewis, Mobilio, Perry, & Raman, 2004). However, spamming is one of the 
major drawbacks of email advertising among consumers. Spam is unsolicited commercial 
messages sent to individuals usually by strangers. Therefore, email marketers should 
legitimize their email advertising campaigns by receiving permission from consumers to 
prevent becoming victims of spam filterers (Blanzieri & Bryl, 2008; Delany, 
Cunningham, & Coyle, 2005). 
Banner advertising, which first appeared in 1994 (Jansen & Mullen, 2008), is a 
form of display advertising illustrating graphical images inside vertical or horizontal 
boxes on webpages. A click on a banner redirects consumers to the merchant website 
associated with it. In 2009, displayed ad format had 22% of online advertising revenue 
share, and it reached 24% in 2010 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010). However, views 
regarding the effectiveness of banner advertising have been inconsistent among 
marketing experts. Some believe that online users pay less attention to banner ads and 
have learned to avoid banner advertisements (Dreze & Hussherr, 2003; Hollis, 2000), 
whereas others have proven that banner advertising has a significant effect on Internet 
purchase behavior (Manchanda, Dubé, Goh, & Chintagunta, 2006). Yet due to the 
obtrusive nature of banner advertising, it has shared its popularity among marketers in 
Background and Research Context  
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display advertising with content-targeted text-based advertising1 (Goldfarb & Tucker, 
2010). This recently emerged content-targeted advertising is an advertising model, where 
ads are either manually or automatically targeted to the content of the webpages. 
2.2  Search Engine Advertising 
With the advent of search engines, Internet marketing also has evolved. Search engines 
are providing service for over 50% of Internet users on a daily basis (Purcell, 2011); 
therefore, they have the potential to be a new and powerful marketing channel for 
advertisers. Search Engine Advertising (SEA), also known as Search Engine Marketing 
(SEM) or Sponsored Search Marketing, has recently received significant attention from 
both academia and industry. According to the most recent report by SEMPO 
(Econsultancy, 2011), the North American search engine marketing industry has 
increased in value from $14.6B in 2009 to $16.6B in 2010 and 16% growth was 
estimated in 2011, reaching a value of $19.3B by the end of 2011. The proportion of 
companies carrying out Search Engine Optimization (SEO) has been reported to be at 
around 86%, while the percentage of companies engaging in paid search marketing was 
almost 80% in 2011 (Econsultancy, 2011). The Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) 
reports that search engine advertising in the fourth quarter of 2010 had a 19% increase in 
ad revenue compared to the same quarter in 2009 and a 15% increase compared to the 
third quarter in 2010 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010). IAB also reports that the most 
popular ad format in 2010 was Search Engine Advertising, representing 46% of the total 
online advertising revenue. 
 
                                                
1 Google AdSense is the dominant provider of content-targeted ads online. 
Background and Research Context  
 
11 
Sponsored search advertising has alleviated some of the reasons that marketers 
avoid advertising on the Internet. Academic research has shown that perceived goal 
impediment, perceived ad clutter, and prior negative experiences with online ads are 
major problems with conventional forms of Internet marketing, such as banner ads 
(Chang-Hoan & Cheon, 2004). However, perceived goal impediment (showing ads that 
are not aligned with the consumer’s goals), the strongest factor in ad avoidance on the 
Internet, is diminished in SEA. Matching the ads to a consumer’s query is one of the 
primary goals of search engine providers (Ghose & Yang, 2010; Google, 2011b). 
Evidently, all three agents of the sponsored search marketplace (i.e. the search engine, the 
advertisers and the consumers) have their own significant impact on the marketplace 
(Yao & Mela, 2011). The nature of the interaction and the benefits are threefold: search 
engines provide relevant results to the user queries resulting in user satisfaction, and 
acquisition of more users. More users would attract more advertisers to advertise on 
SERPs and consequently, search engine revenue increases. At the same time, an 
advertiser’s ads would be displayed to the users with potential interest to the products or 
services the advertiser is offering (see Figure 2-1). In summary, not only advertising on 
the search engines does not have an obtrusive nature (contrary to banner advertising), but 
also, it will display relevant content to the consumers (contrary to email advertising), 
intensifying the popularity of this new advertising channel. 
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Figure 2-1: Three-way interaction of search engine, advertisers, and 
consumers. 
 
Search engine marketing is performed in two ways: search engine optimization 
(SEO) and sponsored search advertising. SEO is the enhancement of website content and 
visibility to be more search engine friendly. In other words, by optimizing website 
content and structure, webpages can appear at higher positions in natural (organic) search 
results. Sponsored search advertising is like any other advertising media, where 
advertisers pay a fee in order to appear on the SERPs. The following scenario explains 
the mechanics of search engine advertising. Consider a user submitting a query 
(keyword) consisting of one or more words to the search engine2. The search engine not 
only shows natural (organic) search results, but also displays sponsored search results 
promoted by advertisers. Placement of these sponsored results is different in various 
search engines, but mainly they appear at the top and right hand sides of SERPs. Figure 
                                                
2 User query and keyword are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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2-2 shows an example of such a page from Google search engine, where the user query is 
“buy laptop”. The top and right hand side rectangles illustrate sponsored search results, 
whereas the left-bottom rectangle illustrates natural search results. 
A Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction determines where the ads (also called 
ad copies) should be positioned on the search engine result page (Edelman et al., 2005). 
With the submission of each query, an online (real time) auction is conducted among 
advertisers bidding on that query. To enter the auction, each ad has to be relevant to the 
searchers query and pass a certain minimum relevancy criteria (Google, 2011b). To 
position the ads on the result page, the search engine calculates the ad rank (related to the 
position of the ad on SERP) by multiplying an advertiser’s maximum Cost-Per-Click 
Figure 2-2: Placement of sponsored and organic search results on 
Google SERP. 
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(CPC) and its Quality Score. CPC is the amount that each advertiser is willing to pay for 
each particular keyword and Quality Score is a dynamically calculated value that 
determines how relevant the ad is to a user’s query. If a user clicks on any ad, the 
corresponding advertiser will be charged slightly more than the bid value of the next 
advertiser’s ad in the ad list (For an example and some exceptional cases, refer to 
(Google, 2011a)). This billing mechanism is called second price pay-per-click (PPC), 
which has gained a lot of attention compared to other forms of billing like pay-per-
impression (CPM) as the advertisers are only paying for the ads only when they are 
actually being visited by the consumers (Rey & Kannan, 2010). 
As mentioned above, Quality Score is a determinant of how much users of search 
engine find ads relevant to their keywords. Quality Score is dependent on a number of 
factors such as ad quality and historical performance of the advertiser’s ad and is 
calculated every time a user submits a query. Therefore, due to the dynamic nature of the 
Quality Score, it is always possible for advertisers to improve their ad campaigns. Figure 
2-3 shows the determinants of Quality Score according to Google (2011b). This figure 
shows that there is a huge emphasis on Click-Through-Rate (CTR) in the calculation of 
the Quality Score. CTR is the number of searchers’ clicks on an ad, divided by the total 
number of times that the ad is displayed (also known as impressions). For example, if an 
ad is displayed 100 times and only 5 searchers click on that particular ad, the CTR for the 
ad is 0.05. The landing page is the webpage where the searcher is taken to when s/he 
clicks on the ad. 
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Figure 2-3: Google Quality Score factors. 
 
As it is apparent from these criteria, controlling Quality Score is not an easy task 
as adjusting bidding value. A weak Quality Score can easily lead to disqualification of an 
ad from appearing on the SERP. Even if the ad can enter the auction with a weak Quality 
Score, the advertiser has to enormously overbid the true value of the ad slots to be able to 
secure the desired position. Furthermore, without a fixed price mechanism for ad slots, 
advertisers are competing in a growing competitive environment where their ad positions 
are highly related to their competitors’ strategies and performance. Recently, there has 
been a growing stream of published literature (both from academia and practitioners) 
related to sponsored search advertising (Jansen & Mullen, 2008). The following section 
briefly summarizes some of the academic literature in this stream. 
! The historical CTR of the keyword and the matched ad on the Google domain 
! Account history, measured by the CTR of all the ads and keywords in the account 
! The historical CTR of the display URLs in the ad group 
! The relevance of the keyword to the ads in its ad group 
! The relevance of the keyword and the matched ad to the search query 
! Account’s performance in the geographical region where the ad will be shown 
! The quality of the landing page 
! Other relevance factors 
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2.3  Sponsored Search Literature Review 
Previously, sponsored search has been studied from different perspectives. While some 
researchers focused on the auction process and investigated mechanism design of such a 
market, others have empirically modeled the sponsored search ad performance. The 
empirical work in this area either focused on advertiser strategies or consumer search 
behavior in the sponsored search market. 
2.3.1 Mechanism Design in Search Engine Auctions 
The search engine advertising model displays ads that are based on user queries. It was 
first introduced by GoTo.com3, and used auctions to display ads on SERPs. In the 
GoTo.com model, the ads with the highest bidding values showed up at the top positions 
on the SERP. Later, Google started incorporating relevancy attributes into its auction 
design by not only displaying ads based on highest bidding values, but also based on the 
number of clicks that each ad receives. The total amount that the auctioneer charges the 
advertisers is calculated by multiplying the number of clicks by the bid value over a 
specific period. Therefore, an ad with high CTR value would return higher revenue 
compared to more expensive, less clicked ads. 
In this regard, a number of studies have focused on mechanism design of 
sponsored search auctions. Appendix A lists an overview of existing literature in this 
area. Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is the dominant mechanism design 
currently used by search engines. Each advertiser m submits a bid bmj stating the 
maximum amount they are willing to pay for a click on an ad related to keyword j. Search 
                                                
3 GoTo.com was created in 1998, which was then renamed to Overture in 2001, and later 
Overture acquired by Yahoo! In 2001 Google started its own search advertising model and 
introduced Google AdWords. 
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engine places the bidders in descending order of bmj * qmj, where qmj is the quality of the 
advertiser m’s ad for the keyword j; i.e., how relevant the ad is to the user’s query. If the 
user clicks on advertiser m’s ad, the advertiser will be charged slightly more than bnj, 
where bnj is the amount that the advertiser, whose ad is listed just below advertiser m, is 
willing to pay for the ad. 
GSP, compared to other conventional auction designs (e.g. Generalized First Price 
or Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions), generates more profit for the search engines 
(Edelman et al., 2005; Jansen & Mullen, 2008). Edelman et al. (2005) proved that there is 
no equilibrium in dominant strategies in GSP auctions. Therefore, advertising decisions 
are constantly dependent on other participants of the market place. Consequently, some 
studies tried to constrain the GSP auction mechanism in an attempt to explain the game 
theory behind sponsored search auctions favoring advertisers (Aggarwal et al., 2007; 
Aggarwal et al., 2006; Asdemir, 2006; Edelman et al., 2005; Varian, 2007). Others have 
proposed new slot allocation mechanisms to maximize search engines’ revenue (Edelman 
& Schwarz, 2007; Feng et al., 2007; Lahaie, 2006; Liu & Chen, 2006). 
Derived from the Nash equilibrium, Varian (2007) proposes a “symmetric” 
equilibrium for slot allocation in complete information auction settings. Similar to 
Edelman’s (2005) findings, he argues that optimal bids in sponsored search auction are 
dependent on the bids of the other agents in the market place. Asdemir (2006) shows 
patterns of bidding war cycles in sponsored search auctions. He suggests that bidding 
under estimated value can prevent advertisers from being in a bidding war cycle. 
Aggarwal et al. (2007) introduce position-based design, where advertisers are able to 
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specify the minimum rank they would like to appear at along with their bids. They prove 
that the so-called position-based design is both envy-free4 and bidder-optimal. 
Giving more priority to the benefits of the auctioneers, Aggarwal et al. (2006) 
introduce a truthful “Laddered Auction” mechanism. The authors argue that truthfulness 
promotes simplicity in advertisers’ bidding strategy, removing incentives for under-
bidding behavior, and utility maximization of both auctioneers and merchants. Lahaie 
(2006) compares two different auction designs used by Yahoo! and Google in existence 
of complete and incomplete information: Rank By Bid (RBB) and Rank By Revenue 
(RBR). The author implies that the existence of relevancy factors in RBR model leads to 
harder conditions in playing the equilibrium compared to RBB model. Liu and Chen 
(2006) also compare auction designs by Google and Yahoo! in an incomplete information 
auction setting. They imply that with higher competition in effect, Google’s mechanism 
design (which incorporates relevancy attributes) generates more revenue compared to 
Yahoo!. Likewise, Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007) argue that first price auction design 
originally utilized by Yahoo! has enabled bidders to strategically bid on keywords 
resulting in revenue losses for the search engine. Feng et al. (2007) simulate several 
ranking mechanisms in an incomplete information auction setting. The authors propose 
that incorporating relevancy attributes or editorial filtering into ranking mechanism 
would highly increase the search engine revenue. Edelman and Schwarz (2007) also 
show that GSP auction design with a reserve price for keywords is an optimal auction 
setting for search engines and the reserved price is independent of the number of 
                                                
4 Envy-free in a division problem is a situation where all the players in the game think 
s/he has the best division possible and no other player has better piece. 
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competitors. Furthermore, with an increase in competition, more revenue for the search 
engine will be generated. 
It is clear from mechanism design literature that incorporating ad relevancy 
metrics in the auction design has benefits for both advertisers and search engines. While 
it has been proven that it generates more revenue for the auctioneer, it also opens more 
avenues for advertisers to strategically design their advertising campaigns. One of the 
shortcomings of previous research in mechanism design is operationalizing the ad 
relevancy simply by measuring the CTR value. CTR is a key determinant of the ad’s 
Quality Score and a higher Quality Score results in a higher position of the ads on the 
SERP; however, as previously discussed, CTR is not the only factor affecting the Quality 
Score.  The mechanism design literature has rarely incorporated other factors such as ad 
copy content and the landing page quality in their studies. Another issue in the existing 
mechanism design literature is that the analysis of competition is modeled using only a 
few (e.g. two) advertisers (Asdemir, 2006; Liu & Chen, 2006). The sponsored search 
marketplace is a dynamic environment with thousands of firms continuously entering the 
market. Modeling the marketplace characteristics should account for competition 
intensity between advertisers. An increase in competition intensity has a direct effect on 
both sponsored search revenue (Edelman & Ostrovsky, 2007) and advertisers’ bidding 
strategies (Varian, 2007). 
Finally, as Lahaie (2006) points out, budget constraints can affect the design 
equilibrium. Advertisers are restricted by resource constraints in their advertising 
campaigns, and this could significantly affect their role in the marketplace equilibrium. 
Existing research has failed to specifically address the constraints that the budget 
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allocation can impose on the marketplace both in terms of search engines’ revenue and 
advertisers’ bidding strategies. 
2.3.2 Empirical Research in Sponsored Search Ad Performance 
Another stream of research in sponsored search advertising has focused on search engine 
ad performance metrics. This stream of research has used econometric models to model 
the relationships between various sponsored search variables. These variables have been 
measured either at keyword level (e.g. length of the keywords) or firm level (e.g. number 
of keywords) settings. Appendix A summarizes the existing work in this area. 
Ganchev, Kulesza, Tan, Gabbard, Liu, and Kearns (2007) propose approaches 
that should be taken in order to model advertisers’ bidding behavior in sponsored search 
auctions. They conclude that removing data related to certain strategies (e.g. jamming 
bids to deplete competitors’ budgets) can contribute to finding a better fit for bidding 
data. Rutz and Bucklin (2007) propose a method to calculate individual keyword’s cost 
per sale and consequently, a model to generate high performance keywords. Ghose and 
Yang (2009) used keyword level variables, ad position, and landing page quality to 
explain consumer search and purchase behavior, advertisers’ cost-per-click, and search 
engine ranking mechanism. In another study, Ghose and Yang (2008) propose a model 
for calculating optimal bidding values and evaluate advertisers’ overbidding and 
underbidding patterns based on keyword level attributes. Surprisingly, their conclusions 
for optimal bidding values (CPCs) are in contrast to their earlier study: the presence of 
retailer and brand specific information in keywords increase optimal bid price, while long 
tail keywords decrease optimal bid price. In another study on search data from Yahoo!, 
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Rey and Kannan (2010) propose a model to optimize the bidding value of the keywords 
based on estimated conversion rate of each keyword. 
Some studies have investigated the relationship between sponsored search 
advertising and organic search results. Jansen and Spink (2007) report that combining 
organic listings together with sponsored search results decreases the CTR of sponsored 
search results. Yang and Ghose (2010) show that the presence of both sponsored and 
organic listings results in a synergy that increases the CTR on both listings. Richardson, 
Dominowska, and Ragno (2007) propose a logistic regression model to estimate the CTR 
of newly created ads. They incorporate information about terms relativity, quality, 
content, and scope of the ads. 
A very nascent stream of research emerging in sponsored search is the effect of 
spillovers between different marketplace variables. Ghose and Yang (2010) have 
modeled the consumers’ search-to-purchase behavior over different product categories. 
They conclude that there is a high probability that consumers searching for a product in a 
category might not only purchase a product in that category, but also tend to buy a 
product from a different category. They further elaborate their results based on keyword-
level attributes such as retailer-specific keywords and brand-specific keywords. Rutz and 
Bucklin (2011) introduce the concept of “awareness of relevance” in keywords, and 
propose that there is a strong asymmetric spillover from generic search to branded search 
activity. 
The emerging empirical research in sponsored search marketplace reveals the 
variety of questions and nascent development of research in this area. Apparently, 
difficulties in data acquisition, heterogeneous characteristics of search engines, and 
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uncertainty about proprietary slot allocation algorithms have led to inconsistent results in 
this stream of research5. Previous researches have used a variety of metrics for measuring 
and estimating search engine advertising performance. Both financial performance 
metrics (e.g. revenue) and consumer behavior metrics (e.g. CTR) have been the subject of 
measuring the performance of sponsored search campaigns. However, each metric targets 
a specific advertising strategy (e.g. brand awareness) and fails to provide a landscape for 
measuring the performance of sponsored search advertising. In fact, it is the nature of 
marketing and advertising where media planning, budget allocation, and performance 
assessment becomes challenging for managers even in traditional settings (Cheong, De 
Gregorio, and Kim, 2010; Lavrakas, Mane, and Laszlo, 2010). 
Furthermore, most of the previous studies are based on data from only a single 
firm’s marketing campaign. The competitive nature of the sponsored search market 
requires incorporating competition intensity when performing empirical analysis. The 
lack of competition data has also been emphasized in previous literature (e.g. Ghose and 
Yang, 2009; Rutz and Bucklin, 2007). Finally, search engines constantly change their ad 
slot allocation mechanisms. Therefore, some of the assumptions in the previous empirical 
research have changed, as the allocation mechanisms have evolved. An example is the 
evolution of ranking mechanism from being only based on bid values to integrating ad 
relevancy factors into the equation. Although this dynamic nature of sponsored search 
might have challenged the ongoing research, it has led to a fertile stream of empirical 
research in the information systems and marketing fields. 
 
                                                
5 These are the results of advertising hassles imposed by the policies of the advertising 
intermediaries. Edelman (2009) lists five rights that are taken from advertisers when they sign up 
to these intermediaries. 
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2.3.3 Consumer Search Behavior 
Uncertainty about consumers’ search behavior is one of the most prominent factors that 
make online advertising a challenging task. Figure 2-4 is the means-end model relating 
price, quality, and value, as proposed by Zeithaml (1988). The model shows that the 
decision process that leads to a consumer purchase combines several intrinsic and 
extrinsic attributes together, which is unique to each and every individual consumer. It is 
also clear that in the very end of the process, it is the perceived value of an item (in this 
context, the perceived value that each sponsored result can produce for consumers), 
which determines if the consumer is going to take an action (e.g. clicking the sponsored 
ad). In sponsored search advertising context, consumer search behavior drives the 
selection of the keywords, the design of the ad copies, and the overall advertising 
campaign strategy. In addition, it is the search engine policy to show relevant ads in the 
Figure 2-4: A means-end model relating price, quality, and value 
(Zeithaml, 1988) 
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higher spots, as the ads on the top spots receive more attention from users. Users have 
different mindsets when searching on the Internet, and search engines can show more 
results that are relevant if they recognize users’ intent during their search session. In this 
regard, Jansen et al. (2008) provide a hierarchical classification of user intent on search 
engines, derived from previous research in sponsored search advertising. In their 
research, queries are categorized into informational, transactional, and navigational web 
queries. 
Much of the work in consumer search behavior overlaps with the research 
reviewed in the previous section. For example, several studies by Ghose and Yang (2008, 
2009, 2010) also have implications related to online consumer purchase behavior. Jansen 
and Resnick (2006) have reviewed a large body of literature related to consumer search 
behavior in search engines. They conclude that consumers’ preference towards organic 
results is stronger; however, consumers rate the non-sponsored result pages as relevant as 
sponsored result pages. Furthermore, they find that integrating sponsored and non-
sponsored search results do not increase user attention towards sponsored results (Jansen 
& Spink, 2009). 
One important implication from previous research regarding consumer search 
behavior is how the user search behavior can be captured by click-through-rate (CTR). 
Due to privacy concerns as well as difficulties in data collection, it is laborious to capture 
a decent sample of user search behavior data. The CTR value is one of the best indicators 
of the consumer search behavior, as it incorporates both impressions and actual user 
clicks. While impressions define how many consumers are searching for a particular 
product (much like reach and frequency in traditional advertising media), consumer 
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clicks are an indicator of relevancy of the advertisement based on consumer evaluation. 
More specifically, a click by the consumer indicates that the position, information 
content, and presentation of the ad have been reliable enough to be regarded as a relevant 
search result. Interpreting CTR as a measure of consumer involvement also provides the 
rational for RBR ranking mechanisms discussed in the previous section. 
2.4  Internet Retailers 
This study focuses on Internet retailers and their competition in sponsored search 
advertising. Being at the very end of supply chain, the online retailing industry has shown 
to be excessively competitive, especially with the emergence of new website technologies 
(Agrawal & Smith, 2009). With the worldwide spread of the Internet, not only the “brick 
and mortar” companies have adopted this new technology to become “click and mortar” 
companies, but also a new form of pure-play businesses have emerged. Reports show that 
seasonally adjusted 2010 e-commerce sales were $164.6 billion and represented 4.2% of 
total retail spending (InternetRetailers, 2011). Reported profits and sales indicate that 
Internet retailing is a firmly established and increasingly profitable market (Venkatesan, 
Mehta, & Bapna, 2007). 
Competition is an indisputable characteristic of the retail industry. Striving for a 
greater market share has forced retailers to adopt differentiation strategies in order to be 
on top of their market. The online world has even intensified this competition by 
removing the geographical boundaries and its worldwide exposure. It is no surprise that 
advertising in this growing high competitive online market could be quite challenging. 
Merchants, regardless of their channel category, size, and product category, utilize all 
forms of Internet marketing to advertise their products and services. Therefore, focusing 
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on Internet retailers in studying the sponsored search market not only sheds light on the 
design characteristics of the sponsored search advertising campaigns, but also provides an 
appropriate environment to understand the effect of competition intensity on the 
relationship between ad position and its key determinants. 
 
  
Chapter 3  Conceptual Model and Theoretical Foundation 
This chapter proposes the conceptual model used in this study (Figure 3-1). The 
positioning strategy of the firm in sponsored search marketplace is correlated with the 
actual position of its ads on SERP. The ad position itself is an outcome of a strategic 
mixture of sponsored search auction determinants, which is observable in the form of 
bidding values and ad relevancy attributes. Furthermore, this relationship takes place in a 
competitive environment, where the competition intensity is projected in a high-stakes 
battle for keywords and ad slots. The following sections will explain the proposed 
research framework. First, I will explain why the outcome of positioning strategy can be 
reflected in ad position and how it can be compared to other performance metrics in 
previous studies. Then I will discuss the key determinants of ad position based on 
existing academic and practitioners’ findings. Finally, I will provide an overview of the 
keyword market with a focus on keyword competition. 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Conceptual model. 
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3.1  Positioning Strategy and Ad Performance 
The following quote by Ries and Trout (2000, p. 3) gives a clear definition of 
positioning: 
“... positioning is not what you do to a product. Positioning is 
what you do to the mind of the prospect. That is, you position the 
product in the mind of the prospect.” 
A similar analogy can be drawn for the sponsored search marketplace by 
conceptualizing ad copies as products that advertisers are willing to sell to consumers (by 
drawing consumers’ attention to it). The term “positioning” in sponsored search can be 
simply understood as the placement of the ads on a search page. However, on a more 
complex level, positioning strategy is a direct reflection of how a firm wants to appear in 
a consumer’s mind. For example, consumers may perceive high priced items as having 
premium quality compared to their lower priced equivalents. Within the sponsored search 
context, the higher the position of the ads can suggest better product quality and a higher 
reliability of the advertiser. In the end, it is the consumers’ perceived value of an item 
that drives his/her decision process (Ahmed, 1991; Zeithaml, 1988) and advertisers are 
constantly studying consumer behavior and strategizing their marketing campaigns to 
target their audiences more accurately. Positioning and differentiation strategies have 
been the focus of marketing in various contexts such as service positioning (Shostack, 
1987), positioning in tourism industry (Ahmed, 1991), and positioning in retail computer 
market (Brooksbank, 1994). 
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Providing a ranked list of ads, search engines have enabled advertisers to target 
different consumer segments. This has been done by applying demographic filters1 and 
by providing a competitive positioning setting. Advertisers can pursue their marketing 
goals through targeting a certain ad position on SERPs. For example, one advertiser 
might aim for top advertising slots to pursue brand awareness and recognition (Dou et al., 
2010; Rutz & Bucklin, 2011). Whereas, by aiming at middle positions (cheaper ads and 
more conversion rate), another advertiser might be interested in revenue maximization 
(Ghose & Yang, 2009). The directional nature of the sponsored search marketplace has 
enabled advertisers to strategize their campaigns based on consumers’ perception of 
different ad positions (Animesh et al., 2011). 
The examples above demonstrate that advertisers have some guidelines for their 
advertising goals based on implications from consumer search behavior (e.g., top position 
leads to brand awareness, or lower position implies lower product cost). Unfortunately, 
previous research on ad performance has used different performance metrics that make 
comparisons difficult and implications inconsistent. Consumer behavior metrics (such as 
CTR) (Agarwal, Hosanagar, & Smith, 2008; Animesh et al., 2011) and financial metrics 
(such as revenue per click) (Agarwal et al., 2008; Rutz & Bucklin, 2007) have all been 
used as performance metrics; often dependent on the ad position, informational content of 
the ad copies, and other sponsored search variables. However, the relationship between 
ad position and ad performance is not a one-way relationship (Figure 3-2). As such, the 
ad position is partly determined by the historical performance of the ad campaign (e.g., 
CTR). On the other hand, advertisers are becoming more aware of consumer behavior 
                                                
1 Advertisers can target a specific geographic region, or a certain period for their ads to be 
displayed. However, these demographic factors are not the focus of this study. 
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and it is their interest to develop and implement their marketing strategies according to 
different consumer segments. For example, knowing that the quality seeking consumers 
usually surf the ads in the premium positions, advertisers offering higher quality products 
are interested in securing premium ad slots for their advertisement. Therefore, one 
fundamental question is how to design the ad campaign to reach the desired ad position 
which takes into account the marketing goals of the advertiser. 
 
Figure 3-2: Sample two-way relationship between ad position and consumer clicks. 
 
Previous research has focused on either optimizing bid values of sponsored search 
keywords or explaining the strategies that would maximize economic welfare (revenue). 
However, despite ample practical evidence in the industry regarding the importance of 
the ad position, empirical research in sponsored search advertising has given limited 
attention to ad position as a dependent variable. This study uses ad position as the 
dependent variable and investigates how sponsored search variables are related to the 
position of the ads on the SERP in a competitive environment.  
3.2  Determinants of Ad Position 
To achieve the desired ad position, advertisers need to know how to customize, control, 
and strategize the ad position determinants. Analyzing and describing the key factors of 
the sponsored search ad position has also been the focus of the mechanism design 
literature (Edelman & Ostrovsky, 2007; Rutz & Bucklin, 2011; Varian, 2007). For 
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example, Rutz and Bucklin (2011) model the change in ad position as a function of 
awareness carryover, current CPC, historical CTR, and seasonality indicators. Also, Feng 
et al. (2007) suggest that auction designs that incorporate both bidding value and 
relevancy attributes are producing more revenue for the search engines. Most of the 
research related to mechanism design has focused on winning the top position in the 
auction process. This stream of research mainly focuses on strategies for bid adjustment, 
rarely incorporating CTR as the determinant of the slot allocation process (Liu & Chen, 
2006). Furthermore, as it was previously discussed, the search engine ad rank formula is 
much more complicated than just being conveyed by the CTR value.  
An overview of the mechanism design literature in sponsored search (Appendix 
A) reveals that both bidding strategies and ad relevancy attributes contribute to the 
position of the ads on SERP. Bidding strategies are mainly in control of the advertiser in 
terms of setting bidding values and budget limits. Advertisers are in control of setting bid 
values for each keyword in the auction process. However, as the auction mechanism 
follows the GSP auction rules, they will be charged by the highest bid value submitted by 
the next competitors. In the end, it is the advertiser who can strategize the bid value either 
to win the competition and spend the maximum cost per click or bid on the keyword as 
much as his evaluation of the keyword’s value (Aggarwal et al., 2006; Asdemir, 2006; 
Ghose & Yang, 2008).   
On the other hand, ad relevancy attributes are mainly in control of the search 
engine as the auctioneer in the auction process. Advertisers can indirectly influence their 
ad quality (e.g., by following SEO practices or creating relevant ad copies). However, in 
the end, it is the search engines proprietary algorithm that determines the relevancy score. 
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These two dimensions also conform to the guidelines published by the search providers 
(see Section 2.2 ). Likewise, this study categorizes the sponsored search determinants 
into bidding and relevancy dimensions to evaluate their main effects on ad position 
(Figure 3-3). 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Bidding strategy and ad relevancy attributes as determinants of 
ad position. 
 
3.3  Competition Intensity 
Similar to other marketplaces, competition in online sponsored search markets has forced 
advertisers to adopt differentiation strategies (e.g. quality or price) in order to distinguish 
themselves from their rivals. Fortunately for the advertisers, the pay-per-click mechanism 
employed by search engines allows them to enter the competition from diverse 
demographics. Even smaller companies with low advertising budgets, and without well-
known brands, can enter the competition. However, with the increase in the number of 
advertisers, the competition is becoming increasingly intense. Auction theory states that 
an increase in the number of competitors increases the winning bids (Brannman et al., 
1987). Sponsored search marketplace as an adopter of auction mechanism design is no 
different. Competition in the marketplace causes the per-click values to vary across 
different advertising slots and even if the position is cost free (organic results), it might 
not be desirable (Xu, Chen, & Whinston, 2008). Furthermore, in a GSP auction setting, 
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the per-click value is related to the allocation of the slots and bids of the other 
competitors, not solely on the advertisers’ own bid (Jansen & Mullen, 2008; Varian, 
2007). From the users’ perspective, not only does the order of the ads affect the user 
behavior, but also the probability of an ad getting clicked is dependent on other ads on 
the result page (Aggarwal, Feldman, Muthukrishnan, & Pál, 2008). Therefore, it is vital 
to account for the competition intensity while analyzing ad performance in the sponsored 
search market. 
Previous empirical research in search engine advertising has always questioned 
the impact of competition on the marketplace variables. Yet, lack of publicly available 
data both from search engines and advertisers, as well as difficulties in capturing users 
behavior due to privacy concerns are main reasons for limited consideration of 
competition in empirical evaluations. A recent exception (closely related to the topic of 
this study) is the work by Animesh et al. (2011). In their work, the authors model the 
competition by calculating the number of firms with similar unique selling propositions 
in relation to the focal firm’s ads. However, like other empirical studies in sponsored 
search, they are focusing on competition intensity around a focal firm. To the best of my 
knowledge, this study is the first empirical research that uses ad position as the dependent 
variable and investigates the determinants of ad position in sponsored search in a cross-
sectional setting where the level of competition in the keyword market is explicitly 
incorporated in terms of the number of firms competing for similar keywords. 
 
 
  
Chapter 4  Research Hypotheses 
In this chapter, I derive the research model (Figure 4-1) from the conceptual framework 
presented in previous chapter and formulate several hypotheses for the proposed study. 
As it was stated previously, positioning strategy of the firm is reflected in the position of 
the ad on the SERPs. The ad position is not the only mechanism for implementing 
positioning strategies; in addition, other factors such as ad content also contribute to the 
positioning strategy of the firm. However, the focus of this study is the ad position as one 
of the main anticipating mechanisms of achieving positioning strategy of the firm. The 
following sections present theoretical arguments leading to the relationships between 
sponsored search ad position and its key determinants based on the relevant literature and 
industry practices. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Research model 
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4.1  Main Effects of Ad Position Determinants 
4.1.1 Bidding Strategy 
Bid value is one of the most important determinants of ad position. It is the maximum 
amount of money that an advertiser is willing to spend on each of its keywords. The more 
the advertiser bids on its keywords, the higher the likelihood that the advertiser wins the 
auction. Most previous research in sponsored search advertising (except some related to 
consumer search behavior) use the bid value as a key variable in their models. For 
example, some researchers have tried to propose models for either predicting optimal 
bidding values or controlling the determinants of bidding values (Ghose & Yang, 2009; 
Yang & Ghose, 2010). According to auction theory, setting the bidding value is a 
challenging task prone to winner’s curse1 (often called a Pyrrhic victory). However, 
market equilibrium is not the only factor affecting how much advertisers are willing to 
spend on each keyword2. Advertising goals are also reflected in the bidding values. An 
advertiser may intentionally overbid on some of its keywords to receive a higher CTR by 
appearing at higher positions, leading to a better Quality Score for future ads. Another 
example can be adjusting the bid value based on either “keyword level bid ideas” or 
“group level bid ideas” (refer to Google, 2012). Looking at the ad ranking formula 
presented in Section 2.2 , it can be easily seen that the bid value has a direct impact on 
the final ad position. Therefore: 
                                                
1 Winner’s curse is a phenomenon where the auction winner overpays for the items won  
 and the paid price is more than what actually the item is worth. 
2 For example, bidding under item’s true estimation to avoid winner’s curse. 
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive relationship between a firm’s bid 
value and its ad position on the SERP. 
4.1.2 Ad Relevancy Factors 
According to previous studies related to search behavior in sponsored search advertising, 
consumers’ clicks indicate how they find search engine results relevant to their queries. 
In fact, number of impressions and CTR are extensively used to understand consumer 
search behavior (Animesh et al., 2011; Ghose & Yang, 2009; Jansen & Spink, 2009). 
Furthermore, search engines and anecdotal evidence from practitioners indicate that CTR 
has a direct effect in determining Quality Score. The number of clicks an ad receives is 
an indicator of how good the quality of the ad is and how relevant the ad is to consumer 
search goals. It is also the search engines’ revenue strategy to value the ads with higher 
CTR (Aggarwal et al., 2006). In the long run, the product of bid value and clicks will 
generate higher revenue as opposed to ads with higher bid value and fewer clicks. 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a positive relationship between a 
firm’s click-through-rate (CTR) and its ad position on the SERP. 
Research in advertising and marketing highly emphasize on the information-
content of the ads displayed to consumers (Abernethy & Franke, 1996; Resnik & Stern, 
1977b). The more customized the content of the ads to the consumer needs, the higher the 
likelihood of dragging consumers’ attention to the ads. Non-informative advertising 
would distract consumers. Consumers are becoming information-seeking experts and the 
search process is relatively less expensive than before. Designing targeted ads would 
result in better relevancy metrics, leading to higher Quality Score. The guidelines by 
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search engines for ad design also conform to the academic findings (Google, 2011c). Ad 
copies can contain catchwords related to the brand, price, and even location of the 
product. Besides, they display the landing page URL of the advertisement. As a result, 
they are composed of several relevancy metrics recommended by the search engine 
guidelines. Advertisers are given the option to design multiple ads for each ad group and 
provide customized ad content for their ad groups. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a positive relationship between a firm’s ad 
quality and its ad position on the SERP. 
4.1.3 Competition Intensity 
Although the direct effect of competition on the ad position is not the main hypothesis of 
interest in this study, it is necessary to include it when analyzing its impact on other 
market variables. It is logical to think that an increase in the market competition will 
significantly impact the position of the ads on the SERP. The following scenario 
simplifies why an increase in competition intensity affects ad position. With only one 
firm bidding on a keyword, there is only one advertiser willing to pay for an advertising 
space. If the ad passes minimum relevancy criteria, the probability of appearing on the 
top spot is 100%. However, an increase in the number of advertisers (e.g. 10 competitors 
bidding on the same keyword), keeping other factors constant between competitors, the 
probability of securing the top position becomes 10%. With further increase in the 
number of competitors bidding on the same keyword (e.g. 100 competitors), the 
probability will decline further. Therefore: 
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Hypothesis 4 (H4): There is a negative relationship between the level of 
competition intensity in the marketplace and a firm’s ad position on the 
SERP. 
4.2  Interaction Effects 
4.2.1 The Interaction between CTR and CPC 
It is evident from the ad ranking mechanism that CTR and bid value simultaneously 
effect the ad position. Practitioners’ experience indicates that in order to decrease the 
advertising costs in sponsored search advertising, it is important to increase the CTR of 
the ads. Bidding excessively to create brand awareness in the beginning of the sponsored 
search marketing campaign would direct more customers to the retailers’ websites. With 
an increase in impressions and customer clicks, the bid value is less likely to be the major 
determinant of the firm’s ad position on the SERP. Therefore, when ads with higher CTR 
exist in the competition, the impact of bidding values will be lower on the ad position. On 
the other hand, CTR is an important element of the ads’ Quality Score. As previously 
mentioned, an increase in the Quality Score would increase minimum relevancy threshold 
that an ad requires to enter the auction. Therefore, ads with high bid values and low 
Quality Scores will be automatically removed from the auction and subsequently the 
bidding value will lose its advantage in determining the ad position.    
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The positive relationship between a firm’s bid value 
and ad position is affected by CTR, such that with higher CTR, the 
impact of bid value on Ad Position will be diminished. 
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4.2.2 Moderating Effects of Competition Intensity 
Consumers have different objectives when they are making a purchase. With variety of 
products available, the consumer compares different products and decides which product 
is better according to her quality metrics. According to Zeithaml (1988), “evaluations of 
the quality take place in a comparison context”. Comparison context inevitably resembles 
competition context: While consumers are busy comparing ads from different 
advertisers3, advertisers are competing to target their desired audience in the market 
place. Adapted from Edelman & Schwarz (2007), I use the term “market depth” to refer 
to the number of advertisers bidding on the same keyword. Increase in the “market 
depth” mirrors that the keyword is favorable by many advertisers; therefore, “market 
depth” is an indicator of competition intensity in the sponsored search marketplace. 
An increase in competition intensity increases the winning bids in auctions 
(Brannman et al., 1987). But how would an increase in winning bid impact the ad 
position? Advertisers increase their bidding values to secure a higher ad position. With an 
increase in the competition intensity, the winning bids will be higher than in a less 
competitive environment. Therefore, the increase in bid value will compensate for the 
increase in competition, diminishing its direct effect on the ad position (the main effect). 
In other words, with an increase in competition intensity, the average winning bid will 
increase among competitors and if a company is strategizing to appear on top spots just 
by increasing its bid value, it should increase the bid value taking the level of competition 
into consideration. For example, consider a situation where few advertisers are bidding 
on a similar keyword. If the advertiser is willing to spend twice as the suggested bid 
                                                
3 The same argument holds within organic results context where consumers are deciding 
which organic result is meeting their demands. 
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value by Google, its ad appears at the top spot. With an increase in the competition, the 
advertiser should bid more than twice of the keyword estimated price to implement the 
same strategy (i.e. securing the top spot). Furthermore, an increase in winning bids would 
exhaust the advertising budget in a short time (if it is not set properly). With no 
advertising budget, no matter how optimized the rest of the factors are, the ads will not 
show up in the result page. Therefore, the average ad position will diminish in time. The 
following hypothesis translates the above arguments. 
Hypothesis 6a (H6a): The positive relationship between a firm’s bid 
value and ad position is moderated by keyword competition, such that 
this positive relationship is weakened by an increase in keyword 
competition. 
A study by Liu and Chen (2006) shows that in order to maximize their revenue, 
search engines should favor advertisers with low CTR values when the number of 
competitors increases. An increase in the number of competitors decreases the 
competitive advantage of the CTR value and the placement of the ads will be more based 
on bidding values. An example would clearly explain the logic behind this assumption. 
Consider a situation where only one advertiser is bidding on the keyword. Clearly, 
regardless of how relevant the ad is to the searcher’s query, the advertiser would bid 
minimally as he is the only one appearing on the SERP. With a few advertisers bidding 
on the keyword (keeping the bid value constant between advertisers), the companies 
benefit from having a high CTR value. The one with the highest product of CTR4 and 
bidding value will secure the top spot and others will follow. An increase in the number 
                                                
4 CTR is one of the determinants of relevancy (quality score), but here the situation is 
simplified for the sake of clarity. 
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of advertisers would increase the number of advertisers with higher CTR values. 
Therefore, existence of several companies with high CTR value would reduce the 
advantage of having a high CTR value5. Therefore, ads will be positioned by their 
corresponding bid values (the product of CTR and bid value will be higher for such ads). 
On the other hand, existence of many companies with high CTR values increases the 
minimum ad relevancy threshold that ads require to enter the auction pool for a given 
keyword. This increase in the minimum ad relevancy threshold will create a pool of ads 
with similar CTR values, reducing the competitive advantage of having a high CTR 
value. This example will formally translate to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6b (H6b): The positive relationship between a firm’s CTR 
value and ad position is moderated by keyword competition, such that 
this positive relationship is weakened by an increase in keyword 
competition. 
The ad copy content creation and customization is an in-house strategy, which is 
in control of each advertiser. The message that each ad copy contains can significantly 
define positioning and differentiating strategies of the firm. The use of the search term in 
the ad copy content and using buzzwords such as “cheap” or “discount” can clearly 
convey the message of the advertisement. However, with competitors’ ads listed around 
the focal retailer’s ad, attention of the searchers might be dragged away from the ad 
(Animesh et al., 2011). With few ads displayed on the SERP, each ad has better chance of 
differentiating itself from the rivals. An increase in the number of competitors with 
                                                
5 Section 2.2 explains how Google enters the advertisers into the auction by first 
evaluating them based on minimum relevancy criteria. 
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similar offerings might result in distraction from the focal ad’s unique differentiating 
message. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 6c (H6c): The positive relationship between a firm’s ad 
quality and ad position is moderated by keyword competition, such that 
this positive relationship is weakened by an increase in keyword 
competition. 
4.3  Control Variables 
Given the diversity of the Internet retailers and the complexity of the sponsored search 
market, some variables should be controlled in order to accurately evaluate the proposed 
model. 
Advertising resources are always limited for any firm. Firms cannot allocate 
unlimited advertising budget to their campaigns. Operationalization of the advertising 
budget has been the focus of many previous studies (see Mitchell, 1993). In fact, setting 
the advertising budget is a critical decision in media planning when budgets are allocated 
to different media outlets (Little & Lodish, 1969). 
Setting the advertising budget has certainly an impact in the sponsored search 
market equilibrium (Auerbach, Galenson, & Sundararajan, 2008; Lahaie, 2006). The 
budget limit is not reflected directly in the ad rank formula; however, it has an effect on 
the average ad position. If it is set too low, the firm runs out of the daily ad budget 
quickly. Consequently, even if other factors of ad rank were optimal, the search engine 
would not display the ads when the firm’s daily ad budget is depleted. Therefore, 
searchers would not see the ads in subsequent searches, and eventually the ad rank will be 
affected. 
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The quality of the landing page is constantly on the list of sponsored search 
optimization criteria. Landing page quality is also highly correlated with the SEO 
practices and incorporates, but is not limited to the quality of the page header, website 
description, URL of the page and structure of the website. Impact of SEO strategy, a 
closely related Internet marketing strategy to SEA, has also been the center of attention in 
many studies before (Rutz & Bucklin, 2011). Improving the landing page quality results 
in a better campaign performance, such as an increase in profits (Ghose & Yang, 2009). 
Previously, spillover effects of organic and sponsored results have proved that SEO and 
ad rank are in direct correlation (Ghose & Yang, 2010). Also, practitioners constantly 
recommend SEO practices as a strategy in sponsored search campaigns to decrease 
bidding costs; and usually companies invest both in SEO and sponsored search at the 
same time (Econsultancy, 2011). Therefore, the impact of SEO quality should be 
considered in the formulation of sponsored search advertising. 
Finally, measures have to be taken to control for the size and merchant category 
of the Internet retailers. The sponsored search environment has enabled companies from 
diverse demographics advertise their products and services online. Therefore, not only 
the performance of the companies should be measured in their own market sector 
(Ayanso, Lertwachara, & Thongpapanl, 2010; Ayanso, Lertwachara, & Thongpapanl, 
2011), but also their differences in size should be considered (Ghose & Yang, 2009). In 
summary, this study uses advertising budget, SEO quality, merchant category, and 
company size as control variables in the proposed research model. 
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Chapter 5  Data and Methodology 
This chapter presents the data collection procedure, the research methodology, and the 
empirical results of the study. Figure 5-1 illustrates an overview of the operational 
variables derived from the proposed research model. The variables in parentheses are the 
constructed variables corresponding to each research variable. 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Research model and the operational variables. 
 
5.1  Description of Variables 
In this study, three sources of data are used to test the aforementioned hypotheses. 
The first dataset is the data related to the market segment addressed in the analysis. As 
discussed in the introduction section, this study focuses on online retailers’ sponsored 
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search advertising campaigns. To obtain a list of retailers relevant to the study, the most 
recent list published by Internet Retailer’s “Top 500 Guide” is used (Vertical Web Media, 
2011). This list ranks top five hundred retailers by their annual sales in 2011. Vertical 
Web Media has been publishing data about Internet retailers since 1999 and is one of the 
leading companies providing business intelligence for the e-commerce market. The top 
500 guide not only ranks the Internet retailers based on their annual sales, it also 
categorizes companies into four merchant types (i.e. web only, retail chain, consumer 
brand manufacturer, and catalog/call center) and 15 merchandise categories (Appendix 
B). 
The other two datasets contain sponsored search ad campaign data for the top 500 
retailers. The analysis in this study is based on campaign data from Google search engine. 
Obviously, the primary source of data collection is Google itself. However, sponsored 
search data are proprietary data only available to each advertiser in its AdWords account. 
Google has provided a set of tools for advertisers in order to get some estimates when 
designing their own sponsored ad campaigns1. Moreover, lots of third party tools are also 
providing sponsored search data by crawling Internet websites, including Google search 
engine result pages, and using Google provided application programming interfaces 
(APIs) to generate comprehensive data for search engine marketers. To collect campaign 
data, data from Spyfu (SpyFu, 2012) and KeywordSpy (KeywordSpy, 2012) are used. 
Both companies are leading providers of keyword research technology and competitive 
intelligence to search engine advertisers. IBM, Toyota, and American Express are some 
of the major companies using KeywordSpy tools for their sponsored search advertising 
                                                
1 Google AdWords Keyword tool, Google Trends, Google Search Insights, etc. For an example 
look at: https://adwords.google.com/select/KeywordToolExternal 
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and SpyFu has been endorsed in The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, and 
Forbes.  
Table 5-1 summarizes the definition of the variables that are used in this study. To 
measure bid value, estimated minimum and maximum CPC values are averaged across 
all keywords for each company. Although the CPC cannot replace the advertiser’s true 
bidding value (as GSP is a second price auction), it can be regarded as a close estimate of 
bid value. Advertisers constantly adjust their bid values based on the actual market 
outcomes (Asdemir, 2006). Therefore, if they observe they are overbidding on a 
keyword, compared to its actual CPC, they will adjust the bid value accordingly. A 
similar argument holds for the daily budget. Although it is unknown how much a 
company has dedicated to its sponsored search advertising campaign, the actual average 
daily ad spending gives an estimation of the allocated budget. Furthermore, data 
regarding both CPC and daily spending values are collected with similar methodology for 
all companies; therefore, the values are consistent across different companies. The CTR 
value is calculated by dividing clicks per day by the number of daily searches. 
Unfortunately, ad impressions are proprietary for each company and only each advertiser 
has access to the real values. In this study, instead of using ad impressions, the number of 
times that a firm’s keywords are searched is used. For example, if a company is bidding 
on 2 keywords and the first keyword has been searched 20 times and the second keyword 
has been searched for 30 times during a day, the total number of daily searches for the 
company would be 50 daily searches. The number of searches cannot truly reflect the 
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Table 5-1: Definition of variables 
Dependent Variable Description Source 
Ad Position The monthly average position of the company’s ads across all of its keywords. Average Ad Position 
Independent Variables   
Cost-per-Click The amount that Google charges an advertiser every time someone clicks on their ads. The value 
is averaged over a month across all keywords. 
(Min CPC + Max CPC) / 2 
Click-Through-Rate 
 
Number of clicks that a company received during a day on all of its keywords divided by the 
number of keyword searches in a day.  
Clicks per Day / 
Daily Searches 
Ads-per-Keyword Number of ads that a company runs divided by the number of keywords that a company is 
bidding on. 
Number of Ads / 
Number of Keywords 
Competition The average number of companies that their ads are displayed along with the focal firm’s ads. Average Ad Competitors 
Control Variables   
SEO Quality The firm’s ranking in the organic results across all of its keywords (Rank 1 is the top rank on the 
SERP) 
ln(Organic Rank) 
Web Sales The year 2010 online only sales of the firm. ln(Web Sales) 
Budget The firm’s average daily spending for sponsored search advertising. ln(Daily Budget) 
Merchant Indicates whether the merchant is a web only channel (coded as 1) or has multiple sales channels 
(coded as 0) 
Merchant Type 
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exact number of impressions (ads might not show up when a user searches for a 
keyword); however, it can estimate the number of impressions with reasonable 
probability.  
To measure the ad copy quality, a proxy is defined by dividing the number of ad 
copies to the number of all paid keywords. This ratio is used to represent the level of the 
firm’s “Ad Quality”. Greater levels of ad quality imply that the firm has put more effort 
into crafting these ad copies for each keyword (or keyword group).  
To operationalize the market depth, the number of companies that their ads appear 
along with each focal firm’s ads is used. Generally “Mass Merchants” encounter higher 
number of competitors as they are bidding on keywords related to multiple categories of 
products. For example, if an ad appears on the third position on the SERP and there are 9 
other ads displayed alongside the ad, the ad position will be 3 and the number of 
competitors would be 9 (the focal advertiser itself is excluded) for that keyword. The “Ad 
Position” and “Competitors” variables are both averaged over a period of a month. 
Furthermore, the value of the ad positions has been subtracted from the highest value to 
make the interpretation of the results easier. With this transformation, a high number 
depicts better ad position, while a lower one presents ads that are displayed at bottom 
positions. 
The operationalization of the remaining control variables is straightforward. To 
control for company size, annual sales figures published by retailers themselves are used. 
Sales figures have been extensively used in various disciplines such as economic and 
accounting (Adams, Hill, & Roberts, 1998; Hart & Oulton, 1996). Specifically, annual 
web sales instead of total sales are used for controlling the company size. This would lead 
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to identification of active online retailers instead of inclusion of retailers generating high 
sales via offline sales channels. It is logical to assume that companies advertising online 
are more interested in promoting their online sales channels instead of their offline sales 
channels. 
To control for SEO quality of the companies, the overall organic rank of the 
companies are log transformed. To qualify to appear on the top organic results, 
companies need to rigorously optimize their SEO strategies. Therefore, organic rank 
could be a good candidate to control for overall SEO efforts of the company.  
Finally, to control for the type of the merchants, the merchants are categorized 
into “web-only” firms, denoting firms without physical store, and “multi-channel” firms, 
denoting firms with both physical and online stores (click and mortar). The second 
category includes retailers from catalog/call center, consumer brand manufacturer, and 
retail chain. 
5.2  Data Collection 
Data was collected for the 500 retailers for the month of February 2012 from all 
three data sources: Top 500 Retailers, KeywordSpy, and SpyFu.  The top 500 retailers 
were used as the starting pool of companies. Some of the companies in the pool had 
multiple Internet domains listed for their online channels. Either the first domain (i.e. the 
primary domain) or the domain targeting North American population was selected for 
multi-domain companies. For example, Amazon has specific domain names for each 
country but only “Amazon.com” was selected as the primary domain and 
“Amazon.co.uk” and similar domains were removed from the options. This assumption 
does not create any bias in the data as the sponsored search data are collected based on 
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each domain instead of each company. Furthermore, all the “Mass Merchant” companies 
were removed from the pool as they appear to bias the competition in the market. The 
mass merchant companies (e.g., Amazon.com) work across several product categories. 
Therefore, they can appear as competitors in every product category. 
An astute reader might ask if the selection of retailers based on being “top Internet 
retailer” creates any bias in the results. To address this issue it is important to note that 
being the top Internet retailer does not necessarily mean that the firm has optimized 
sponsored search campaigns. Selection of top Internet retailers is important, as it is 
evident that these companies are successful in utilizing Internet as one of their retailing 
channels. Table 5-2 shows dispersion of firms over merchandise categories and merchant 
types after the data collection procedure. 
 
Table 5-2: Dispersion of firms over merchandise categories and merchant 
types 
Merchandise Category Multi-Channel Web Only Total 
Apparel/Accessories 89 20 109 
Automotive Parts/Accessories 2 3 5 
Books/Music/Video 5 7 12 
Computers/Electronics 21 12 33 
Flowers/Gifts 7 2 9 
Food/Drug 11 3 14 
Hardware/Home Improvement 6 8 14 
Health/Beauty 11 10 21 
Housewares/Home Furnishings 20 8 28 
Jewelry 5 7 12 
Office Supplies 3 4 7 
Specialty/Non-Apparel 15 20 35 
Sporting Goods 12 7 19 
Toys/Hobbies 7 8 15 
Total 214 119 333 
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 The pool of the Internet domains from the “Top 500 Guide” was submitted to the 
two other third party data providers. The data from all three data sources were matched 
and domains with missing values in their sponsored search data were removed. The 
missing values were either due to the limitation of the third parties in collecting data for 
those companies or because the domains did not have sponsored search campaigns.  
To test whether the sample population is representing companies with diverse 
search engine advertising skills, the pay-per-click (PPC) rank score for each retailer 
estimated by SpyFu is used. The PPC rank score estimates how well the advertisers’ ads 
are ranked on the sponsored search results across all of their keywords and how often 
users click on these ads. Figure 5-2 reveals that the distribution of the companies over 
PPC score has a normal distribution. Values from 1 to 5 show high PPC rank and Low 
PPC rank respectively. This indicates that the sample population of retailers comprises 
companies with low, medium, and high performance PPC campaigns.  
 
Figure 5-2: Distribution of companies over their “PPC Rank” scores. 
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Table 5-3 presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations of the key 
research variables. Evidently, CPC and CTR are positively correlated to the Ad Position. 
The numbers provide preliminary support for H1 and H2 and show a significant positive 
correlation of these variables with the Ad Position. Moreover, the Competition variable is 
correlated with the Ad Position with a significant negative value. This high correlation 
was expected and provides preliminary support for H4.  
It is also interesting to look at two other correlations in the results. First, SEO 
Quality has a significant negative correlation with Ad Position. SEO Quality is measured 
capturing SEO rank of each merchant over all of its organic keywords. A smaller number 
shows a better rank in the organic listings. Second, the positive correlation between CPC 
and Competition conforms to the expectations in auction theory. With an increase in 
competition intensity, the bid values to win the auction tend to be higher (Brannman et 
al., 1987).  
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Table 5-3: Means, standard deviations and correlations of key variables (February 2012). 
!! Variable! Mean! S.D.! N! 1! 2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7! 8! 9!
1! Ad!Position! 5.2037! 1.83503! 333! 1.000!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !2! SEO!Quality! 8.0855! 1.45142! 333! D.131*! 1.000!
! ! ! ! ! ! !3! Daily!Budget! 7.407! 1.3218! 333! D0.004! D.583**! 1.000!
! ! ! ! ! !4! Web!Sales! 17.7208! 1.21407! 333! D0.032! D.196**! .238**! 1.000!
! ! ! ! !5! Merchant!Type! 0.36! 0.48! 333! D0.075! .212**! D.189**! D0.106! 1.000!
! ! ! !6! CPC! 0.3571! 0.09219! 333! .310**! 0.080! .128*! D0.030! D0.055! 1.000!
! ! !7! CTR! 0.0561! 0.07025! 333! .144**! 0.017! 0.084! D0.073! .173**! .246**! 1.000!
! !8! Ads!Per!Keyword! 1.8493! 0.68673! 333! D0.032! D0.035! .268**! .114*! D.204**! .205**! D0.051! 1.000!
!9! Competition! 7.1758! 1.06647! 333! D.568**! .184**! 0.099! D0.028! D0.072! .438**! 0.007! .244**! 1.000!
!! *!Correlation!is!significant!at!the!0.05!level!(2Dtailed).! !! !! !! !! !! !!
!
**!Correlation!is!significant!at!the!0.01!level!(2Dtailed).!
! ! ! ! ! !
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5.3  Research Methodology 
To evaluate the research model presented in this study, hierarchical multiple regression 
(Aiken & West, 1991; Montgomery et al., 2001) is used. To explain the relationships 
between the predictor variables and the ad position, eight different models based on the 
proposed research framework were created (Table 5-4). In all models, αi is the intercept, 
βis are the regression coefficients, and εi captures the unexplained error term. Model 1 
incorporates only control variables to account for the variability of companies in terms of 
size, budget, SEO quality, and merchant type. All Control variables except the merchant 
type have been transformed using natural log function to derive a linear relationship 
between dependent and independent variables.  Model 2 and 3 enter main effect variables 
to test the main effect hypotheses. To test the moderating effects, models 4 to 7 are 
constructed by entering interaction effects one at a time, and model 8 by entering all 
moderators simultaneously. The interaction terms in models 4 to 7 provide the necessary 
results to test the hypotheses involving the moderating effects individually.   
The empirical analyses have been performed in two stages. First, all the February 
2012 data were tested to fit the regression model. A significant effect of the merchant 
type was found in the models using the full dataset; therefore, the data set was divided 
into two datasets representing each merchant type. Then, the analysis was performed for 
each merchant type separately. 
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Table 5-4: Hierarchical multiple regression equations. 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Model 7 
 
Model 8 
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5.4  Empirical Results 
The results from the analysis on the full dataset can be found in Table 5-5. The 
baseline specification is presented in Model 1. In this model, the variations between 
retailers are explained by entering only control variables to the model. The coefficient of 
SEO Quality is negative and highly significant (beta = -0.248, p < 0.01). The smaller SEO 
Quality value indicates better SEO rank on the SERP (Table 5-1) and the negative 
coefficient is expected: companies with higher SEO rank have better ad positions. Model 
2 shows that CPC has a significant positive effect on the Ad Position (beta = 6.871, p < 
0.01) supporting H1. A higher CPC value is related to a higher Ad Position. The 
coefficients for CTR and AdsPerKeyword are not significant and they do not support H2 
and H3, respectively. 
 Inclusion of the Competition variable in Model 3 has a significant impact on the 
model fit and significantly increases the R2 (R2Change = 0.559). It also has a significant 
negative coefficient (beta = -1.506, p < 0.01) providing support for H4. With more 
competitors bidding on the same keyword, the ad will be displayed at a lower position. 
The coefficient of CPC is still significant in model 3 supporting H1. A higher CPC value 
is related to a higher Ad Position. However, there is no support for H2 and H3.  
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Table 5-5: Regression results (February 2012 data) 
Dependent'Variable:''
Ad'Position' Model'1' Model'2' Model'3' Model'4' Model'5' Model'6' Model'7' Model'8'
Intercept' 9.803' 10.67' 7.442' 7.764' 7.375' 7.765' 7.404' 7.759'
' (1.897)' (1.817)' (1.054)' (.999)' (1.055)' (1.034)' (1.05)' (.985)'
Web'Sales' E0.073' E0.029' E0.07' E0.082' E0.069' E0.083*' E0.072' E0.088*'
' (.085)' (.08)' (.046)' (.044)' (.046)' (.045)' (.046)' (.043)'
Daily'Budget' E0.164' E0.283**'E0.063' E0.052' E0.061' E0.069' E0.058' E0.049'
' (.094)' (.094)' (.055)' (.052)' (.055)' (.053)' (.055)' (.051)'
SEO'Quality' E0.248**'E0.342**'E0.048' E0.064' E0.046' E0.055' E0.047' E0.061'
' (.085)' (.082)' (.049)' (.046)' (.049)' (.048)' (.049)' (.045)'
Merchant'Type' E0.232' E0.258' E0.375**' E0.353**' E0.399**' E0.351**'E0.387**'E0.401**'
' (.214)' (.206)' (.119)' (.113)' (.121)' (.117)' (.119)' (.112)'
CPC' ' 6.871**' 13.688**'14.573**'13.528**'14.12**' 13.8**' 14.517**'
' ' (1.087)' (.68)' (.66)' (.694)' (.674)' (.68)' (.665)'
CTR' ' 2.303' 0.03' 1.612*' 0.083' 0.052' 0.022' 1.645*'
' ' (1.409)' (.816)' (.814)' (.817)' (.799)' (.813)' (.811)'
Ads'per'Keyword' ' E0.172' 0.098' 0.104' 0.099' 0.106' 0.045' 0.067'
' ' (.147)' (.086)' (.081)' (.086)' (.084)' (.09)' (.085)'
Competition' ' ' E1.506**' E1.529**' E1.493**' E1.572**'E1.5**' E1.535**'
' ' ' (.059)' (.056)' (.06)' (.06)' (.059)' (.057)'
CPC*CTR' ' ' ' E47.76**' ' ' ' E45.069**'
' ' ' ' (7.715)' ' ' ' (8.358)'
Competition*CPC' ' ' ' ' 0.538' ' ' 1.148*'
' ' ' ' ' (.473)' ' ' (.484)'
Competition*CTR' ' ' ' ' ' E3.77**' ' E2.166*'
' ' ' ' ' ' (.955)' ' (1.038)'
Competition*'
Ads'per'Keyword' ' ' ' ' ' '
0.148'
(.079)'
0.115'
(.078)'
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
RESquared' 0.032' 0.164' 0.723' 0.753' 0.725' 0.736' 0.726' 0.763'
RESquared'Change' 0.032**' 0.132**' 0.559**' 0.03**' 0.002' 0.013**' 0.003' 0.04**'
Number'of'observations' 333' 333' 333' 333' 333' 333' 333' 333'
Standard'errors'in'parentheses.'' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
**''p<.01'' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
*''''p<.05'' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
 
58 
Model 4 results show that the interaction between CPC and CTR is significant 
(beta = -47.76, p < 0.01). Therefore, H5 is supported. Figure 5-3 illustrates the interaction 
plot between CTR and CPC. The CPC has a positive influence on the Ad Position. 
However, at higher CTR values, CPC values will have a lower significant positive impact 
on the Ad Position. Similarly, at lower CTR values, CPC values will contribute more to 
the Ad Position. This is in line with the study expectation in H5. The CTR has a positive 
influence on overall Quality Score. Consequently, when ads with higher Quality Scores 
enter the auction, the minimum Quality Score threshold for entering the auction will 
increase. Therefore, ads with high bid values and low Quality Scores are less likely to 
qualify for entering the auction, thus the impact of CPC diminishes. 
Model 5 tests the impact of Competition on the relationship between CPC and Ad 
Position. The interaction is not significant and does not provide support for H6a. 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Effect of CTR on the CPC-Ad Position relationship 
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Figure 5-4: Effect of level of Competition on CTR-Ad Position relationship 
 
Model 6 investigates the interaction between Competition and CTR. The 
interaction coefficient is significant (beta = -3.77, p < 0.01) and therefore H6b is 
supported. At a higher keyword competition level, the impact of CTR on ad position will 
be diminished. The interaction plot is illustrated in Figure 5-4. With more advertisers 
bidding on the same keywords, most of the ads in the auction pool will have high CTR 
values. Consequently, an ad’s CTR value loses its competitive advantage among other 
ads.  
The interaction plot illustrated in Figure 5-5 indicates that the interaction between 
Competition and AdsPerKeyword is slightly significant at 10% (beta = 0.148, p < 0.1). 
The figure illustrates that at higher levels of keyword competition, quality of ads has a 
significant positive relationship with the position of the ads (opposing H6c). However, 
the significance level is not strong enough to develop this hypothesis further, and more 
evidence is needed to make such a claim. 
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Figure 5-5: Effect of level of Competition on Ads per Keyword-Ad Position 
relationship 
 
Finally, Model 8 takes all of the main and interaction effects into account (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, & William, 1998). The interaction plots for the full model are 
demonstrated in Figure 5-6. The results from this model find support for hypotheses H6a 
and H6b. It is important to note that it is possible to construct two other higher-order 
interactions in the study: the three-way interaction between CPC, CTR, and Competition 
and the three-way interaction between CPC, AdsPerKeyword, and Competition. 
However, the coefficients and the increase in R-square of the aforementioned three-way 
interactions were not significant, and, therefore, as Aiken and West (1991) suggest, 
partially constructed models should be investigated in the study of the two-way 
interactions and predictor variables.  
In summary, the study indicates that a firm’s CPC value has a positive 
relationship with its Ad Position on the SERP. However, evidence of such a relationship 
does not exist for CTR and AdsPerKeyword. This positive effect is moderated by CTR. 
With higher levels of CTR values in place, CPC loses its advantage in positioning the ads 
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on the SERP. Furthermore, the level of keyword competition in the marketplace has 
significant impact on the positioning of the ads on the SERP. At a higher level of 
keyword competition, both CTR and CPC values lose their competitive advantage on 
determining the Ad Position. The impact of Competition on AdsPerKeyowrd is not 
consistent across different models; however, the slight significance of the interaction in 
Model 7 provides contradictory results to the study assumptions. It appears that an 
increase in keyword competition intensity would positively impact the relationship 
between ad content quality and ad position on the SERP. 
 
 
a: Effect of CTR on  
CPC-Ad Position relationship 
 
b: Effect of level of Competition on  
CTR-Ad Position relationship 
 
c: Effect of level of Competition on  
CPC-Ad Position relationship 
 
d: Effect of level of Competition on  
Ads per Keyword-Ad Position relationship 
Figure 5-6: Full model interaction effects 
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Careful examination of the results in Table 5-5 indicate that the dummy coded 
variable, Merchant Type, has negative significant effect on Models 3 through 8 (beta ≤ -
0.351, p < 0.01). To investigate further how the market characteristics change based on 
the type of the merchant, the original dataset was divided to two categories: “web-only” 
and “multi-channel” retailers. Table 5-6 presents summary statistics representing each 
group and Table 5-7 and Table 5-8 present regression results for each category. 
Looking at the mean values in Table 5-6 provides interesting preliminary results. 
Note that the mean CTR value for web-only retailers is higher than the corresponding 
value for the multi-Channel retailers. Another significant observation regarding web-only 
retailers is the correlation between SEO Quality and Ad Position. Firms with higher SEO 
Quality (smaller values denote better quality) have better Ad Position, which conforms to 
the study expectation. 
Finally, not only a high negative correlation between Competition and Ad Position 
favors the study assumptions, but also the correlations between Ad Position and CPC, as 
well as Ad Position and CTR for each merchant type provides interesting insights. It 
seems that the ad positions for multi-channel merchants are more reliant on their CPC 
values, whereas, web-only retailers benefit more from their CTR values in position of 
their ads. 
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Table 5-6: Means, standard deviations and correlations of key variables (divided by Merchant Type). 
Multi&Channel, !! Variable! Mean! S.D.! 1! 2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7! 8!
! 1! AdPosition! 5.3059! 1.86104! 1.000!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
2! SEO!Quality! 7.8561! 1.43406! C0.084! 1.000!
! ! ! ! ! !
!
3! Daily!Budget! 7.5932! 1.25588! C0.075! C.620**! 1.000!
! ! ! ! !
!
4! Web!Sales! 17.8167! 1.2799! C0.048! C0.093! .200**! 1.000!
! ! ! !
!
5! CPC! 0.3608! 0.0882! .469**! 0.010! 0.115! 0.009! 1.000!
! ! !
!
6! CTR! 0.0471! 0.06649! 0.102! C0.102! .187**! C0.020! .224**! 1.000!
! !
!
7! AdsPerKeyword! 1.9535! 0.74121! C0.025! C0.001! .218**! 0.114! .178**! C0.030! 1.000!
!
!
8! Competition! 7.233! 1.02737! C.552**! .189**! 0.113! C0.002! .307**! C0.026! .227**! 1.000!
Web&Only, !! Variable! Mean! S.D.! 1! 2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7! 8!
! 1! AdPosition! 5.0197! 1.78024! 1.000!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
2! SEO!Quality! 8.4979! 1.39571! C.184*! 1.000!
! ! ! ! ! !
!
3! Daily!Budget! 7.0722! 1.37579! 0.080! C.475**! 1.000!
! ! ! ! !
!
4! Web!Sales! 17.5482! 1.06931! C0.021! C.370**! .274**! 1.000!
! ! ! !
!
5! CPC! 0.3502! 0.09897! 0.038! .232*! 0.127! C0.125! 1.000!
! ! !
!
6! CTR! 0.0724! 0.07406! .259**! 0.116! 0.023! C0.125! .312**! 1.000!
! !
!
7! AdsPerKeyword! 1.6618! 0.52916! C0.110! 0.033! .304**! 0.037! .257**! 0.015! 1.000!
!
!
8! Competition! 7.0729! 1.13055! C.622**! .232*! 0.047! C0.103! .624**! 0.088! .267**! 1.000!
**!Correlation!is!significant!at!the!0.01!level!(2Ctailed).!
! ! ! ! ! ! !*!Correlation!is!significant!at!the!0.05!level!(2Ctailed).!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
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Table 5-7: Regression results (web-only retailers) 
Dependent'Variable:''
Model'1'Model'2'Model'3' Model'4' Model'5' Model'6' Model'7' Model'8'
Ad'Position'(web>only)'
Intercept' 10.418' 9.606' 9.08' 9.33' 8.97' 9.059' 8.894' 9.078'! 3.587' 3.538' 2.003' 1.962' 2.035' 2.014' 2.007' 1.978'
Web'Sales' >0.173' >0.118' >0.132' >0.147' >0.129' >0.132' >0.127' >0.143'! (.165)' (.16)' (.091)' (.089)' (.092)' (.091)' (.091)' (.089)'
Daily'Budget' 0.004' 0.012' >0.013' >0.015' >0.01' >0.012' >0.005' 0'! (.135)' (.143)' (.081)' (.079)' (.082)' (.082)' (.081)' (.08)'
SEO'Quality' >0.282*' >0.306*' >0.194*' >0.182*' >0.193*' >0.194*' >0.192*' >0.176*'! (.138)' (.142)' (.08)' (.079)' (.081)' (.081)' (.08)' (.079)'
CPC'
'
0.519' 11.677**' 12.417**'11.518**'11.653**' 11.456**'12.269**'! ' (1.804)' (1.251)' (1.26)' (1.334)' (1.261)' (1.265)' (1.335)'CTR'
'
6.501**' 3.686**' 3.866**' 3.767**' 3.725**' 3.755**' 4.22**'!
'
(2.246)' (1.285)' (1.259)' (1.31)' (1.303)' (1.285)' (1.284)'
Ads'per'Keyword'
'
>0.383' 0.009' 0.007' 0.005' 0.006' >0.112' >0.155'!
'
(.324)' (.185)' (.181)' (.186)' (.187)' (.214)' (.211)'
Competition'
' '
>1.596**' >1.658**' >1.587**' >1.591**' >1.56**' >1.608**'!
' '
(.103)' (.104)' (.107)' (.106)' (.108)' (.108)'
CPC*CTR'
' ' '
>35.782*'
' ' '
>47.859**'
''
' ' '
(14.608)'
' ' '
(16.294)'
Competition*CPC'
' ' ' '
0.224'
' '
>0.009'
''
' ' ' '
(.632)'
' '
(.743)'
Competition*CTR'
' ' ' ' '
0.32'
'
1.728'
''
' ' ' ' '
(1.499)'
'
(1.906)'
Competition*'
' ' ' ' ' '
0.218' 0.27'
Ads'per'Keyword'
' ' ' ' ' '
(.193)' (.206)'! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
R>Squared' 0.043' 0.13' 0.724' 0.738' 0.724' 0.724' 0.727' 0.747'
R>Squared'Change' 0.043' 0.087*' 0.594**' 0.014*' 0' 0' 0.003' 0.023*'
Number'of'observations' 119' 119' 119' 119' 119' 119' 119' 119'
Standard'errors'in'parentheses.! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
**''p<.01'! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
*''''p<.05'! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
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   Model 1 from Table 5-7 indicates that there is a positive significant relationship 
between SEO Quality and Ad Position for the web-only merchants (beta = -0.282, p < 
0.05). This result conforms to our expectations as web only retailers actively engage in 
improving quality of their online content and landing pages as the Internet is their only 
selling channel. This result is also consistent in Models 2 and 3 where direct effects of the 
predictors are investigated. Model 2 reveals that CTR has significant positive impact on 
the position of the ads (beta = 6.501, p < 0.01) supporting H2. Model 3 indicates that 
entering competition intensity into the model would not only increase the model fit 
significantly (R2 = 0.724, p < 0.01), but impacts the coefficients and significance of CTR 
and CPC. Results from this model provide support for hypotheses H1, H2, and H4. 
Model 4 provides support for the interaction effect of CTR on CPC-Ad Position 
relationship. Contrary to the study assumptions, there is no interaction between 
Competition and each of the variables, CTR, CPC, and AdsPerKeyword (models 5, 6, and 
7, respectively). Finally, it is most likely that the significant change in R2 in Model 8 
(R2Change = 0.023, p < 0.05) is mainly due to the interaction between CPC and CTR 
variables. 
Table 5-8 presents the results for multi-channel merchants. The results are quite 
different from those obtained for the web-only retailers. Similar to web-only merchants, 
Models 1 and 2 indicate significant negative coefficient for SEO Quality variable (beta < 
-0.274, p < 0.05); however, the coefficient is not significant in Models 3 to 8. Model 2 
shows significant positive coefficients for CPC (beta = 10.792, p < 0.01), providing 
support for H1. Model 3 provides significant results supporting H1 (p < 0.01) and H4 (p 
< 0.01). The interaction between CPC and CTR is significant in Model 4 (beta = -44.588, 
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p < 0.01) and H5 is supported. Models 5 and 6 provide significant results for the 
interaction between Competition and CPC, and Competition and CTR, supporting H6a 
and H6b, respectively. However, H6a assumes that Competition has a negative effect on 
CPC-Ad Position relationship, whereas results show that the impact is positive. The 
interaction between Competition and AdsPerKeyword is not significant in Model 7 and 
H6c is not supported. Finally, Model 8 provides similar results compared to the previous 
models. 
 
a: Effect of level of Competition on 
CPC-Ad Position relationship 
 
b: Effect of level of Competition on 
CTR-Ad Position relationship 
Figure 5-7: Interaction plots for multi-channel retailers 
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Table 5-8: Regression results (multi-channel retailers) 
Dependent'Variable:''
Model'1' Model'2' Model'3' Model'4' Model'5' Model'6' Model'7' Model'8'
Ad'Position'(multi>channel)'
Intercept' 10.43' 11.654' 6.96' 7.317' 6.914' 7.314' 6.915' 7.446'! 2.301' 2.051' 1.195' 1.137' 1.183' 1.161' 1.196' 1.11'
Web'Sales' >0.04' >0.02' >0.075' >0.08' >0.081' >0.095' >0.077' >0.099*'! (.101)' (.087)' (.05)' (.048)' (.05)' (.049)' (.05)' (.047)'
Daily'Budget' >0.297*' >0.428**' >0.065' >0.06' >0.062' >0.064' >0.06' >0.058'! (.13)' (.119)' (.07)' (.067)' (.07)' (.068)' (.071)' (.065)'
SEO'Quality' >0.274*' >0.348**' 0.022' >0.009' 0.033' 0.02' 0.026' 0.006'! (.112)' (.099)' (.059)' (.057)' (.059)' (.058)' (.06)' (.055)'
CPC'
'
10.792**' 15.269**' 16.166**' 15.065**' 15.728**' 15.346**' 16.078**'! ' (1.298)' (.773)' (.757)' (.771)' (.759)' (.778)' (.747)'CTR'
'
0.353' >1.965' 0.282' >2.007*' >1.457' >1.982*' 0.259'!
'
(1.721)' (.991)' (1.049)' (.981)' (.969)' (.991)' (1.022)'
Ads'per'Keyword'
'
>0.13' 0.093' 0.105' 0.102' 0.104' 0.071' 0.124'!
'
(.156)' (.09)' (.085)' (.089)' (.087)' (.093)' (.087)'
Competition'
' '
>1.418**' >1.417**' >1.392**' >1.512**' >1.42**' >1.444**'!
' '
(.069)' (.065)' (.069)' (.071)' (.069)' (.069)'
CPC*CTR'
' ' '
>44.588**'
' ' '
>38.606**'!!
' ' '
(9.202)'
' ' '
(9.706)'
Competition*CPC'
' ' ' '
1.588*'
' '
1.977**'!!
' ' ' '
(.688)'
' '
(.667)'
Competition*CTR'
' ' ' ' '
>4.977**'
'
>3.209*'!!
' ' ' ' '
(1.305)'
'
(1.364)'
Competition*'
' ' ' ' ' '
0.079' >0.01'
Ads'per'Keyword'
' ' ' ' ' '
(.085)' (.082)'
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 'R>Squared' 0.034' 0.287' 0.768' 0.792' 0.774' 0.783' 0.769' 0.806'
R>Squared'Change' 0.034' 0.253**' 0.481**' 0.024**' 0.006*' 0.015**' 0.001' 0.038**'
Number'of'observations' 214' 214' 214' 214' 214' 214' 214' 214'
Standard'errors'in'parentheses.' ! ! ! ! ! ! !
**''p<.01'! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
*''''p<.05'! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
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5.5  Model Validation and Robustness 
5.5.1 Regression Assumptions 
To verify the assumptions of the regression analysis, several tests have been 
performed. Appendix C provides statistical results for testing these assumptions. To 
evaluate the impact of unusual and influential data, Cook’s D influence measure (Cook, 
1977, 1979) is used. Cook’s D measure simultaneously takes into account the residual 
outliers and the observations with extreme values on the predictor variable. Results 
demonstrate that reasonable Cook’s D measures were obtained from the model (Cook’s D 
< 4 / number of observations).  
To assess the normality of the model residuals, two statistical tests were 
performed: Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro & Francia, 1972; Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Lilliefors, 1967). Both tests fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of normality in all models. Thus, the normality assumption is met in all models.  
To test for homoscedasticity, White’s test (White, 1980) and Breusch-Pagan test 
(Breusch & Pagan, 1979) were performed on all models. Both tests fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity in all models except Model 2.  
To test whether there is collinearity between predictor variables, Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIFs) were calculated for each independent variable before mean 
centering the data. All the VIF values were less than 2 which are lower than 
recommended thresholds (e.g. 10) (Montgomery et al., 2001). 
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5.5.2 Robustness 
It is important to also check for model specification issues. The proposed research 
model was tested to see if it can yield similar results for data in a different period. For 
this purpose, sponsored search campaign data for March 2012 have been collected. The 
same procedure for data preparation has been performed and 352 samples collected for 
March 2012. Appendix D provides summary statistics and regression results for the new 
dataset. Except for the slight change in the model fit, results are consistent with the 
February 2012 data across all the study models. 
In studying the robustness of the model, it is also important to check for 
endogeneity. In conventional econometric contexts, the regression model is usually used 
to predict values for a dependent variable and endogeneity becomes critical if there is a 
recursive relationship between the dependent variable and any of the predictor variables. 
Endogeneity has been tested in previous research in sponsored search advertising (e.g., 
Animesh, Ramachandran, & Viswanathan, 2007; Ghose & Yang, 2009). Although the 
research setting in this study is different compared to keyword level econometric settings 
in previous studies, existence of endogeneity can affect the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimation in above analyses. Consequently, the following test was performed to 
validate the above results.  
Specifically, the results of the OLS regression can be biased if the problem of 
endogeneity exists between dependent and independent variables. If in a regression 
model, independent variable X causes dependent variable Y, and vice versa (Y causes X), 
the model suffers from simultaneous causality bias. The simultaneity bias arises in many 
econometric contexts and can be detected by using instrument variables and two stage 
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least-squares (2SLS) estimation. In sponsored search advertising, simultaneity can bias 
the results of the OLS estimation. For example, Animesh, Ramachandran, and 
Viswanathan (2007) use “age” of the website as an instrument variable for “traffic rank” 
in order to examine the simultaneous relationship between “traffic rank” and “position” 
of the seller on sponsored listings. 
In this study, there is a high probability that the CTR is an endogenous variable 
and Ad Position has a positive relationship with CTR. To verify the endogeneity of the 
CTR variable, Hausman’s test (Hausman, 1978) is used to check the presence of bias in 
the OLS estimates. Under H0 of no measurement error OLS is efficient, while under H1, 
2SLS is consistent. The following equations were used to estimate the model using 2SLS: 
'
'
Theoretically, the conversion-rate of the merchant is correlated to the CTR. A 
high conversion rate indicates that the products of the merchant are suitable for customer 
needs, similar to the high CTR, where ads of the merchant are matching the customer 
query. The results from the Hausman’s test are presented in Table 5-9. The results 
indicate that there is no significant difference between OLS and 2SLS estimates and 
therefore there is no need to use an instrument variable (i.e., CTR is not endogenous) 
(Bowden Roger & Turkington, 1984).  
Table 5-9: Hausman specification test 
Hausman's Specification Test Results 
Efficient under H0 Consistent under H1 DF Statistic Pr > ChiSq 
OLS 2SLS 16 2.69 0.9999 
 
  
Chapter 6  Discussion and Implications 
In this chapter, I discuss the results presented in chapter 5 to address the research 
questions as well as the theoretical and practical implications of the study. 
Table 6-1: Supporting results for the hypotheses of the study. 
Hypothesis Web 
Only 
Multi 
Channel 
Full  
Data 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive relationship between a 
firm’s bid value and its ad position on the SERP. 
Yes Yes Yes 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a positive relationship between a 
firm’s click-through-rate (CTR) and its ad position on the SERP. 
Yes No No 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a positive relationship between a 
firm’s ad quality and its ad position on the SERP. 
No No No 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): There is a negative relationship between the 
level of competition intensity in the marketplace and a firm’s ad 
position on the SERP. 
Yes Yes Yes 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The positive relationship between a firm’s bid 
value and ad position is affected by CTR, such that with higher 
CTR, the impact of CPC on Ad Position will be diminished. 
Yes Yes Yes 
Hypothesis 6a (H6a): The positive relationship between a firm’s 
bid value and ad position is moderated by keyword competition, 
such that this positive relationship is weakened by an increase in 
keyword competition. 
No Yes No 
Hypothesis 6b (H6b): The positive relationship between a firm’s 
CTR value and ad position is moderated by keyword competition, 
such that this positive relationship is weakened by an increase in 
keyword competition. 
No Yes Yes 
Hypothesis 6c (H6c): The positive relationship between a firm’s 
ad quality and ad position is moderated by keyword competition, 
such that this positive relationship is weakened by an increase in 
keyword competition. 
No No No 
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6.1  Discussion and Implications 
Search engines have provided advertisers with a new marketing channel to 
promote their products or services on the Internet. The consumer search behavior 
literature clearly indicates that ad position is an important performance indicator for the 
potential success of Internet retailers’ positioning strategies. The main objective of this 
study was to investigate how competition intensity in the keyword market influences the 
relationships between ad position and its key determinants. I used a unique cross-
sectional dataset collected from the top 500 Internet retailers to empirically test the 
relationships between keyword competition, ad position, and ad position determinants, in 
a competitive setting. Hierarchical multiple regression was used to estimate the model 
parameters. To this end, the study draws on the auction mechanism design literature and 
the empirical research on sponsored ad performance and consumer search behavior.  
In particular, the conceptual model is built on the consumer search behavior 
literature to explain firms’ ad positioning strategies. The position of the ads on the SERP 
is used as an indicator of the advertising and marketing performance. Given that 
consumers perceive different values depending on the position of the ads on the SERP 
(Animesh et al., 2011), the location of the ad on the SERP has significant importance for 
sponsored search advertisers in achieving their marketing goals. In addition, the ad 
position has significant effect on a firm’s revenue (Agarwal et al., 2008). The 
significance of ad position for search engine advertisers conforms to similar studies in 
other advertising channels such as television, radio, and newspapers (Brunel & Nelson, 
2003; Pieters & Bijmolt, 1997; Terry, 2005). The primacy (ads appearing in premium ad 
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positions) and recency (recalling the last seen ads) effects both have significant impact on 
persuasiveness of the ads on consumers. 
Arguably, price is one of the main determinants of ad position across various 
advertising outlets. Clearly, it is the nature of any auction to favor the highest bidder. Our 
study indicates that Search engine auctions are no different; they allocate the better ad 
positions to the advertisers with the highest bids (i.e. CPC). Moreover, the impact of bid 
values on ad position is consistent in all the three variants of datasets (i.e. full, web-only, 
and multi-channel retailers). The results are consistent with advertising via other channels 
as well. The newspapers and magazines charge premium prices for showing the ads on 
the front and back cover page; likewise, ads displayed at the beginning of the commercial 
breaks on television and radio have higher rates. 
Another determinant of ad position in sponsored search auctions can be also 
explained by the consumers’ search behaviors. More specifically, consumers’ perceptions 
of the ads have significant effect on the ad positions of search engine advertisers. 
Previous studies in sponsored search advertising have also emphasized the importance of 
the relationship between consumers’ search behaviors and the ad position on the SERP 
(Lahaei, 2006; Liu and Chen, 2006). Ads with higher quality (e.g. rich information 
content) will receive more clicks from consumers. Therefore, search engines have 
incorporated measures to apply the consumer’s click behavior into ranking of the ads. 
Results of this study show that consumers’ clicks (CTR) are an important factor for web-
only retailers. The average ad position from web-only advertisers is influenced by both 
average bidding value and CTR. These results provide evidence that web-only retailers 
are highly customizing their only store front (the Web) for search advertising. 
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CTR does not have a direct significant effect on the ad position of the multi-
channel merchants. This might be due to the fact that multi-channel merchants are 
looking at sponsored search advertising like other conventional advertising channels (e.g. 
television, newspapers), where location of the ad has a price, and forfeiting that price will 
guarantee a spot. The other reason might be that the web-only advertisers are highly 
focused on their Internet advertising, and prevent their multi-channel rivals dominate 
their only storefront. Therefore, they are constantly monitoring their CTR performance 
and do not let the rivals steal the competition from them.  
Giving priority to consumers’ opinion about ads has roots in conventional 
advertising channels. The quality of the ads “is an important influence on consumers’ 
responses to the ad and the brand” (Abernethy & Franke, 1996). In sponsored search 
advertising, CTR is a widely accepted indicator of the consumers’ responses (Cheong, de 
Gregorio, & KiM, 2010). Furthermore, non-informative advertising might result in self-
destruction of the ads (Resnik & Stern, 1977a). Therefore, and especially in sponsored 
search context, both bidding value and quality of the ad play a significant role in 
determining ad position. 
 Another interesting observation in this study is the relationship between the price 
and the quality of the ads in determining ad position. Ads with low CTR values indicate 
that consumers are less attracted to them. For example, uncommon keywords (e.g. “shop 
laptop sz340 in Canada, Ontario”) are rarely entered by searchers looking for 
information. Consequently, the chances of the corresponding ads getting clicked is lower 
compared to ads linked to more popular keywords (e.g. “shop laptop”). Therefore, the 
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lower the minimum quality threshold is, the impact of aggressive bids will be more 
significant in determining premium positions.  
The situation in a high CTR setting is quite different. Ads with high CTR values 
most likely have high quality content. Therefore, the quality threshold for those ads 
entering the auction is much higher than the low CTR ads (search engines adjust the 
minimum quality threshold automatically when the competition for a keyword increases 
and more firms are willing to advertise on a similar keyword). An increase in the 
minimum quality threshold results in elimination of the ads with high bidding values and 
low CTR values. Therefore, ads with unrealistic high bid values (aggressive bidders with 
low CTR values) will be removed from the auction pool, and the average bid value will 
be lower in a high CTR setting.  
The results of this study also shed light on another characteristic of the sponsored 
search market place. The sponsored search market place is built on auction mechanism 
design and the existence of competition in such a market is undeniable (Milgrom & 
Weber, 1982). On one hand, the negative impact of keyword competition on the ad 
position is probably the most expected outcome of this study. The number of merchants 
bidding on the same keywords certainly has a negative effect on the average ad position 
of the focal firm. The same result has been reflected in conventional advertising channels 
(e.g. TV) by referring to “advertising clutter” (all non-program material, e.g., 
commercials). The number of advertisements on a newspaper page or during a TV 
Commercial break, as well as length of the ads has significant impact on the advertising 
performance (Brown & Rothschild, 1993; Pieters & Bijmolt, 1997; Webb & Ray, 1979). 
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The number of competing advertisers has negative impact on consumers’ memory, and 
increases the advertising expenses (Asdemir, 2006; Brannman et al., 1987). 
On the other hand, the keyword competition also has significant impact on other 
variables of the market place. Results of this study indicate that for multi-channel 
retailers, competition has a significant negative moderating effect on the relationship 
between bidding values and ad position. Existence of higher levels of keyword 
competition would require higher average bidding values in order to maintain the average 
ad position. This is also in line with previous results in mechanism design and auction 
theory literature (Asdemir, 2006; Brannman et al., 1987), where, an increase in 
competition intensity increases the winning values.  
Contrary to multi-channel merchants, there is no such evidence for their web-only 
counterparts. The level of keyword competition does not have a significant effect on the 
relationship between the bid values and the average ad positions of web-only merchants. 
This might be due to the fact that web-only merchants have a different mindset in their 
online advertising and they do not follow traditional advertising strategies as multi-
channel merchants do. As previously mentioned, web-only merchants are constantly 
monitoring their online content and are optimizing their only storefront (i.e. Internet). 
This optimized targeting of online consumers might have developed the web-only 
merchants’ ads to be competent in the sponsored search advertising, and any change in 
the level of keyword competition does not affect such advertising strategies. 
The level of keyword competition also has significant effect on the relationship 
between CTR and ad position. The positive relationship between CTR and ad position 
will be weakened at higher levels of keyword competition between multi-channel 
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merchants. This impact has one direct and one indirect explanation. First, the direct 
impact of CTR on ad position is identical to the impact of CPC on ad position. Firms with 
higher CPC or/and CTR values have a better ad position in the market place. Therefore, 
the impact of level of keyword competition on the relationship between CTR and ad 
position can be interpreted in a similar manner to the previous arguments. Second, to 
enter the auction pool, ads should pass certain minimum ad relevancy criteria. An 
increase in the number of competitors increases the number of advertisers with high CTR 
value, resulting in an increase in the minimum ad relevancy threshold. This would lead to 
a new auction pool, where ads have higher overall CTR values. Therefore, ads with high 
CTR values would lose their competitive advantage when they are among their 
equivalent counterparts. 
Results of this study also provide guidelines for practitioners. Convenience of 
Internet technologies and online advertising has enabled web only retailers to easily 
utilize this marketing channel. Web only retailers should carefully monitor their bid 
values and CTR performance simultaneously as both factors are significant indicators of 
ad position. A weak ad copy might result in disqualification of the ad from being 
displayed on the SERP. This might lead to an increase in bidding values to return to the 
same spot. On the other hand, multi-channel retailers should start developing strategies to 
increase their ad quality, particularly CTRs. An increase in the quality of the ads for 
multi-channel retailers can significantly decrease their advertising costs.  
The results from the relationship between bidding values and CTR values indicate 
that bidding aggressively on keywords will not work if the competitors have already 
developed reasonable CTR scores in their campaigns. Excessive bidding on ads with a 
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low quality score will not guarantee a place on the SERP, as the ad is still not meeting the 
minimum quality thresholds to enter the auction. Therefore, advertisers should implement 
strategies for bid management and monitor their ads’ quality constantly. 
Finally, an increase in the competition has significant negative impact on the 
position of the ads. However, selecting keywords without much competition does not 
result in a successful advertising campaign. Not only the quality of the ad copies are 
important for a premium position on the SERP, but also advertisers should select 
keywords that receive fair amount of impression from consumers. Selecting keywords 
with no competition (e.g. specific-long tail keywords) which consumers do not search for 
will reduce the overall ad campaign performance and lowers the overall quality of the 
ads. Therefore, advertisers should select keywords that have reasonable competition on 
them and then strategize their campaigns to distinguish themselves from their 
competitors. 
 
 
  
Chapter 7  Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research 
This chapter provides limitations, future research opportunities, and conclusions 
related to this study. First, limitations of the study are outlined. The limitations create 
several avenues for future research in the same subject area. Finally, the chapter ends 
with the conclusion of this thesis. 
7.1  Limitations and Future Research 
The limitations of this study can be described in two categories. The first category 
is limitations due to the nature of the data that was used in this study. The empirical data 
used in this study were collected during the months of February and March. It is 
important to run the analysis for other months of the year in order to see if the results are 
consistent. For example, during November and December the marketplace characteristics 
could change as the competition for the end of the year sales grows. However, consistent 
results between the current two months of data provide promising results for consistency 
of the model over remaining months of the year. Although this study assumes that 
analyzing data from top 500 retailers did not create bias in modeling the sponsored search 
advertising, inclusion of more Internet retailers would benefit the study, especially when 
analysis is performed on “web-only” and “multi-channel” merchants separately. Dividing 
the data to these two merchant categories provides smaller samples of each group and 
therefore collection of more data might change some of the findings. 
Another limitation of the study is that it uses several proxies to operationalize the 
research variables. For example, to capture the retailers’ bidding values, this study uses 
CPC values. Although CPC values have been extensively used in previous literature 
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(Ghose & Yang, 2009; Rutz & Bucklin, 2007; Yao & Mela, 2011), CPC values cannot 
truly capture the actual bidding values posted by the retailers. Another proxy defined in 
this study was ad quality, captured by number of ads per keyword for each advertiser. 
This proxy can only give a naïve approximation of the quality of the designed ads. 
However, estimating the quality of ad copy itself can be a topic of another study.  
The other category of limitations can be defined as methodological limitations. 
The regression analysis in this study has been performed in a cross-sectional setting. 
Performing the same analysis using panel data (incorporating time series data into 
analysis) could provide additional insights. This study also accounted for the possibility 
of endogeneity for CTR. However, with the existence of panel data, more sophisticated 
econometric models can be investigated to analyze the sponsored search market place. 
For example the recursive effect of the ad position and CTR can be modeled taking 
endogeneity of the CTR values into account. Moreover, the endogeneity test can 
performed using alternative instrument variables if data becomes available.  
 The limitations of this study provide several avenues for future research. First, a 
better proxy for ad copy quality should be created to more accurately examine the 
relationship between ad (content) quality and ad position. The quality of the ad copies 
can be facilitated using techniques like text mining to extract marketing cues in ads 
related to a specific keyword. Another roadmap closely related to the ad content quality is 
constructing the ad Quality Score, using its core determinants such as CTR and landing 
page quality. Then the resulting Quality Score can be used to investigate its relationship 
with ad position on the SERP. 
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 Another extension to the results of this study can be use of simultaneous 
regression equations (e.g. two-stage least squares - 2SLS) and panel data to model the 
relationship between ad position and its determinants (both endogenous and exogenous 
variables). Finally, a closely related area of research which has recently emerged in this 
area (Chang, Oh, Pinsonneault, & Kwon, 2010) is the investigation of competition 
between search engines as market place auctioneers. A possible future research problem 
could be how search engine market share dominance can affect advertisers in developing 
their advertising strategies in such market places.  
7.2  Conclusion 
This study has combined theories from positioning strategy, consumer search behavior, 
and auction mechanism design to draw a conceptual model explaining the position of ads 
on the search engine result pages. The proposed conceptual model was tested on a unique 
cross-sectional dataset from Internet retailers. This study is the first empirical research 
that uses ad position as the dependent variable in the sponsored search market place. The 
importance of the ad position on the SERP can be mapped to a similar concept in 
conventional marketing channels like television and radio (the order of appearance in the 
commercial break between programs) or newspapers and magazines (ads on the front and 
back covers). This study is also the first of its kind to investigate the determinants of ad 
position in sponsored search in a cross-sectional setting where the level of keyword 
competition is explicitly incorporated in modeling such market places. 
The results indicate that consumers’ responses to ads (captured in CTR) and the 
placed bids (CPC) as well as their interaction affect the position of the ads on the search 
engine result pages. These relationships are further influenced by the level of the 
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competition intensity in the market place. More specifically, the position of the ads from 
web-only retailers is more dependent on the relevancy metrics, whereas, multi-channel 
retailers are more reliant on their bid values. This difference between web-only and 
multi-channel retailers can also be seen in the moderating effects of keyword 
competition. Specifically, keyword competition has significant moderating effects only 
for multi-channel retailers. Although there are several avenues for future research, the 
findings of this study contribute to our understanding of keyword competition and its 
effect on search advertising performance.  
 
 
 
  
References 
 
Abernethy, A M, & Franke, G R. (1996). The information content of advertising: a meta-
analysis. Journal of Advertising, 25(2),1-17.  
Adams, C.A., Hill, W.Y., & Roberts, C.B. (1998). Corporate social reporting practices in 
Western Europe: legitimating corporate behaviour? The British Accounting 
Review, 30(1), 1-21.  
Agarwal, A, Hosanagar, K, & Smith, M D. (2008). Location, location, location: An 
analysis of profitability of position in online advertising markets. SSRN eLibrary.  
Aggarwal, G, Feldman, J, & Muthukrishnan, S. (2007). Bidding to the top: VCG and 
equilibria of position-based auctions. Approximation and Online Algorithms, 
4368/2007, 15-28.  
Aggarwal, G, Feldman, J, Muthukrishnan, S, & Pál, M. (2008). Sponsored search 
auctions with markovian users. Internet and Network Economics, 5385/2008, 621-
628.  
Aggarwal, G, Goel, A, & Motwani, R. (2006). Truthful auctions for pricing search 
keywords. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on 
Electronic commerce. 
Agrawal, N, & Smith, S A. (2009). Supply chain planning processes for two major 
retailers. Retail Supply Chain Management, 122, 1-13.  
Ahmed, Z U. (1991). The influence of the components of a state's tourist image on 
product positioning strategy. Tourism Management, 12, 331-340.  
Aiken, L.S., & West, S.G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting 
interactions: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Animesh, A, Viswanathan, S, & Agarwal, R. (2011). Competing "creatively" in 
sponsored search markets: The effect of rank, differentiation strategy, and 
competition on performance. Information Systems Research, 22, 153-169.  
References 
 
84 
Animesh, A., Ramachandran, V., & Viswanathan, S. (2007). An empirical investigation 
of the performance of online sponsored search markets. Paper presented at the 
Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Electronic Commerce 
Asdemir, K. (2006). Bidding patterns in search engine auctions. Paper presented at the 
Second Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions. 
Auerbach, J, Galenson, J, & Sundararajan, M. (2008). An empirical analysis of return on 
investment maximization in sponsored search auctions. Paper presented at the 
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Data Mining and Audience 
Intelligence for Advertising. 
Ayanso, A, Lertwachara, K, & Thongpapanl, N. (2010). Technology-enabled retail 
services and online sales performance. Journal of Computer Information Systems, 
50(3), 102-111.  
Ayanso, A, Lertwachara, K, & Thongpapanl, N. (2011). The effect of customer service 
and content management on online retail sales performance: The mediating role 
of customer satisfaction. AIS Transactions on Human-Computer Interaction 3(3), 
156-169  
Blanzieri, E, & Bryl, A. (2008). A survey of learning-based techniques of email spam 
filtering. Artificial Intelligence Review, 29, 63-92.  
Bowden Roger, J., & Turkington, D.A. (1984). Instrumental Variables. Econometric 
Society Monographs in Quantitative Economics, Cambridge University Press.  
Brannman, L, Klein, J D, & Weiss, L W. (1987). The price effects of increased 
competition in auction markets. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 69(1), 
24-32.  
Breusch, T.S., & Pagan, A.R. (1979). A simple test for heteroscedasticity and random 
coefficient variation. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 47(5), 
1287-1294.  
Brooksbank, R. (1994). The anatomy of marketing positioning strategy. Marketing 
Intelligence & Planning, 12, 10-14.  
Brown, T.J., & Rothschild, M.L. (1993). Reassessing the impact of television advertising 
clutter. Journal of Consumer Research, 20(1), 138-146.  
References 
 
85 
Brunel F.F., & Nelson, M.R. (2003). Message order effects and gender differences in 
advertising persuasion. Journal of Advertising Research, 43 , pp 330-341 
Chaffey, D, Ellis-Chadwick, F, Mayer, R, & Johnston, K. (2009). Internet marketing: 
strategy, implementation and practice: prentice Hall. 
Chang-Hoan, C, & Cheon, H. (2004). Why do people avoid advertising on the internet? 
Journal of Advertising, 33, 89-97.  
Chang, R.M., Oh, W., Pinsonneault, A., & Kwon, D. (2010). A network perspective of 
digital competition in online advertising industries: A simulation-based approach. 
Information Systems Research, 21(3), 571-593.  
Cheong, Y., de Gregorio, F., & KiM, K. (2010). Beyond reach and frequency the power 
of reach and frequency in the age of digital advertising: offline and online media 
demand different metrics. Journal of Advertising Research, 50(4), 403.  
Cook, R. D. (1977). Detection of Influential Observation in Linear Regression. 
Technometrics, 19(1), 15-18.  
Cook, R. D. (1979). Influential observations in linear regression. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 74(365), 169-174.  
Delany, S J, Cunningham, P, & Coyle, L. (2005). An assessment of case-based reasoning 
for spam filtering. Artificial Intelligence Review, 24, 359-378.  
Dou, W, Lim, K H, Su, C, Zhou, N, & Cui, N. (2010). Brand positioning strategy using 
search engine marketing. Management Information Systems Quarterly, 34, 261-
279.  
Dreze, X, & Hussherr, F X. (2003). Internet advertising: Is anybody watching? Journal of 
Interactive Marketing, 17, 8-23.  
Duffy, D L. (2005). Affiliate marketing and its impact on e-commerce. Journal of 
Consumer Marketing, 22, 161-163.  
Econsultancy. (2011). State of search engine marketing report 2011. Published April, 
2010. New York. 
Edelman, B, & Ostrovsky, M. (2007). Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search 
auctions. Decision support systems, 43, 192-198.  
References 
 
86 
Edelman, B, Ostrovsky, M, & Schwarz, M. (2005). Internet advertising and the 
generalized second price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords: 
National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
Edelman, B, & Schwarz, M. (2007). Optimal auction design in a multi-unit environment: 
The case of sponsored search auctions. Manuscript in preparation.  
Feng, J, Bhargava, H K, & Pennock, D M. (2007). Implementing sponsored search in 
web search engines: Computational evaluation of alternative mechanisms. 
INFORMS Journal on Computing, 19, 137.  
Gallaugher, J M, Auger, P, & BarNir, A. (2001). Revenue streams and digital content 
providers: an empirical investigation. Information & Management, 38, 473-485.  
Ganchev, K, Kulesza, A, Tan, J, Gabbard, R, Liu, Q, & Kearns, M. (2007). Empirical 
price modeling for sponsored search. Internet and Network Economics, 541-548.  
Geddes, B. (2010). Advanced Google AdWords: Sybex. 
Ghose, A, & Yang, S. (2008). Analyzing search engine advertising: firm behavior and 
cross-selling in electronic markets. Paper presented at the Proceeding of the 17th 
International Conference on World Wide Web. 
Ghose, A, & Yang, S. (2009). An empirical analysis of search engine advertising: 
Sponsored search in electronic markets. Management Science, 55, 1605-1622.  
Ghose, A, & Yang, S. (2010). Modeling cross-category purchases in sponsored search 
advertising. Paper presented at the Available at SSRN: http://ssrn. com/abstract. 
Goldfarb, A, & Tucker, C. (2010). Online display advertising: Targeting and 
obtrusiveness. Marketing Science, 30(3), 389-404. 
Google. (2011a). How much do I pay for a click on my ad? What if my ad is the only one 
showing?  Retrieved July, 1st, 2012, from 
http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=87411 
Google. (2011b). Quality Score  Retrieved July, 1st, 2012, from 
http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=10215 
Google. (2011c). Tips for creating successful text ads Retrieved July, 1st, 2012, from 
http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=1704392&topi
c=1713975&ctx=topic&path=1714060-1713974 
References 
 
87 
Google. (2012). About bid ideas  Retrieved July, 1st, 2012, from 
http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=2404205 
Hair, J.F., Anderson, R.E., Tatham, R.L., & William, C. (1998). Multivariate data 
analysis: Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Hart, P E., & Oulton, N. (1996). Growth and Size of Firms. The Economic Journal, 
106(438), pp. 1242-1252.  
Hausman, J.A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, 46(6), 1251-1271.  
Hollis, N. (2000). Ten years of learning on how online advertising builds brands. 
Business Week Online,45, 255-268.  
InternetRetailers. (2011). E-commerce sales rise 14.8% in 2010. Retrieved July, 1st, 
2012, from http://www.internetretailer.com/2011/02/17/e-commerce-sales-rise-
148-2010 
Jansen, B, & Spink, A. (2007). The effect on click-through of combining sponsored and 
non-sponsored search engine results in a single listing. Paper presented at the 
Proceedings of the 2007 Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions, WWW 
Conference. 
Jansen, B. J., & Mullen, T. (2008). Sponsored search: An overview of the concept, 
history, and technology. International Journal of Electronic Business, 6, 114-131.  
Jansen, B. J., & Spink, A. (2009). Investigating customer click through behaviour with 
integrated sponsored and nonsponsored results. International Journal of Internet 
Marketing and Advertising, 5, 74-94.  
Jansen, B.J, Booth, D.L, & Spink, A. (2008). Determining the informational, 
navigational, and transactional intent of Web queries. Information Processing & 
Management, 44, 1251-1266.  
Jansen, B.J., & Resnick, M. (2006). An examination of searcher's perceptions of 
nonsponsored and sponsored links during ecommerce Web searching. Journal of 
the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 57, 1949-1961.  
KeywordSpy. (2012). Number one keyword software & keyword tool for keyword 
research & tracking  Retrieved February, 2012, from http://www.keywordspy.com 
References 
 
88 
Lahaie, S. (2006). An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search. 
Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic 
commerce. 
Libai, B, Biyalogorsky, E, & Gerstner, E. (2003). Setting referral fees in affiliate 
marketing. Journal of Service Research, 5, 303.  
Lilliefors, H.W. (1967). On the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality with mean and 
variance unknown. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 62(318), 399-
402.  
Little, J.D.C., & Lodish, L.M. (1969). A media planning calculus. Operations 
Research,17(1), 1-35.  
Liu, D, & Chen, J. (2006). Designing online auctions with past performance information. 
Decision Support Systems, 42, 1307-1320.  
Manchanda, P, Dubé, J P, Goh, K Y, & Chintagunta, P K. (2006). The effect of banner 
advertising on internet purchasing. Journal of Marketing Research, 43, 98-108.  
Martin, B A S, Van Durme, J, Raulas, M, & Merisavo, M. (2003). Email advertising: 
Exploratory insights from Finland. Journal of Advertising Research, 43, 293-300.  
Media, Vertical Web. (2011). Internet Retailer. 
Milgrom, P R, & Weber, R J. (1982). A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 50(5), 1089-1122.  
Mitchell, L.A. (1993). An examination of methods of setting advertising budgets: 
practice and the literature. European Journal of Marketing, 27(5), 5-21.  
Montgomery, D.C., Peck, E.A., Vining, G.G., & Vining, J. (2001). Introduction to linear 
regression analysis (Vol. 3): Wiley New York. 
Myerson, R B. (1997). Game theory: analysis of conflict: Harvard Univ Press. 
Phelps, J E, Lewis, R, Mobilio, L, Perry, D, & Raman, N. (2004). Viral marketing or 
electronic word-of-mouth advertising: Examining consumer responses and 
motivations to pass along email. Journal of Advertising Research, 44, 333-348.  
Pieters, R.G.M., & Bijmolt, T.H.A. (1997). Consumer memory for television advertising: 
A field study of duration, serial position, and competition effects. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 23(4), 362-372.  
References 
 
89 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2010). IAB Internet advertising revenue report: Conducted by 
PwC and Sponsored by the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB). 
Purcell, K. (2011). Search and email still top the list of most popular online activities. 
Retrieved February, 2012, from http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Search-and-
email/Report.aspx 
Resnik, A, & Stern, B L. (1977). An analysis of information content in television 
advertising. Journal of Marketing, 41(1), 50-53.  
Rey, B, & Kannan, A. (2010). Conversion rate based bid adjustment for sponsored 
search. Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on World Wide Web 
WWW 10, 1173.  
Richardson, M., Dominowska, E., & Ragno, R. (2007). Predicting clicks: estimating the 
click-through rate for new ads Proceedings of the 16th International Conference 
on World Wide Web (pp. 521-530). 
Ries, A., & Trout, J. (2000). Positioning: The battle for your mind: McGraw-Hill, p. 3. 
Rutz, O J, & Bucklin, R E. (2007). A model of individual keyword performance in paid 
search advertising. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024765  
Rutz, O J, & Bucklin, R E. (2011). From generic to branded: a model of spillover in paid 
search advertising. Journal of Marketing Research, 48, 87-102.  
Shapiro, S.S., & Francia, RS. (1972). An approximate analysis of variance test for 
normality. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 215-216.  
Shapiro, S.S., & Wilk, M.B. (1965). An analysis of variance test for normality (complete 
samples). Biometrika, 52(3/4), 591-611.  
Shostack, G L. (1987). Service positioning through structural change. The Journal of 
Marketing, 51(1), 34-43.  
Skiera, B, Eckert, J, & Hinz, O. (2010). An analysis of the importance of the long tail in 
search engine marketing. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 9, 
488-494.  
SpyFu. (2012). SpyFu keyword spy tool  Retrieved February, 2012, from 
http://www.spyfu.com/ 
Terry, W.S. (2005). Serial position effects in recall of television commercials. The 
Journal of general psychology, 132(2), 151-164.  
References 
 
90 
Varian, H R. (2007). Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
25, 1163-1178.  
Venkatesan, R., Mehta, K., & Bapna, R. (2007). Do market characteristics impact the 
relationship between retailer characteristics and online prices? Journal of 
Retailing, 83(3), 309-324.  
Webb, P., & Ray, M.L. (1979). Effects of a crowded television environment: The 
ANA/MSI clutter study: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. 
White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a 
direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric 
Society, 48(4), 817-838.  
Xu, L, Chen, J, & Whinston, A. (2008). Price competition and endogenous valuation in 
search advertising. Journal of Marketing Research, Forthcoming, McCombs 
Research Paper Series No. IROM-11-09.  
Yang, S, & Ghose, A. (2010). Analyzing the relationship between organic and sponsored 
search advertising: Positive, negative, or zero interdependence? Marketing 
Science, 29, 602-623.  
Yao, S, & Mela, C F. (2011). A dynamic model of sponsored search advertising. 
Marketing Science, 30, 447-468.  
Zeithaml, V A. (1988). Consumer perceptions of price, quality, and value: a means-end 
model and synthesis of evidence. The Journal of Marketing, 2-22.  
 
Appendices  
 
91 
Appendices 
A. Summary of Literature Review 
 
Table A-1: Summary of existing mechanism design literature. 
Author(s) View Point Auction 
Determinants 
Implications 
Edelman et al. 
(2005) 
Advertiser Bid Value  
CTR 
GSP generally does not have equilibrium in 
dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not 
equilibrium of GSP. 
Applying locally envy-free restrictions on GSP 
leads it to have the same equilibrium as VCG 
design in dominant strategies. 
The locally envy-free equilibrium is the best 
equilibrium for advertisers. 
Varian (2007) Advertiser Bid Value  
CTR 
Optimal bids in the sponsored search auction 
will in general depend on the bids made by 
other agents. 
Proposing a set of symmetric equilibria based 
on Nash equilibria in a full-information 
auction setting. 
Introduces a method for calculating bounds for 
unobserved values of advertisers that can be 
used to estimate the bidding price. 
Lahaie (2006) Search 
Engines 
Advertisers 
Bid Value 
Relevancy 
Bidders do not show their true valuation of ad 
slots. 
RBR model is more complicated compared to 
RBB due to underlying informational 
requirements. 
RBR model is efficient in terms of sum of 
bidders’ revenue in equilibrium. 
Future work: Budget constrains might have 
significant effect in equilibrium. 
Asdemir 
(2006) 
Search 
Engines 
Advertisers 
Bid Value Bidding war cycles can result from a 
symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium 
strategy. 
Advertisers can bid below their valuation. 
Liu and Chen 
(2006) 
Search 
Engines 
Advertisers 
Bid Value 
Relevancy 
Biasing results toward low CTR advertisers, 
search engines can be more efficient. 
Weighted UPC auctions can reduce bidders’ 
risk. 
Google’s auction design can generate more 
revenue compared to Yahoo! when the number 
of competitors is large. 
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Feng et al. 
(2007) 
Search 
Engines 
Bid Value 
Relevancy 
The revenue of the search engine is highly 
correlated to willingness to spend and content 
relevancy of the advertiser. 
Ranking ad slots based on bidding value and 
relevancy at the same time provides higher 
revenue for the search engines. 
Edelman and 
Schwarz 
(2007) 
Search 
Engine 
Bid Value 
Relevancy 
Reserve price of a keyword is independent of 
the number of competitors. 
Increased competition creates more revenue 
for the search engine in GSP. 
Edelman and 
Ostrovsky 
(2007) 
Search 
Engine 
Bid Value Strategic behavior of advertisers results in 
great revenue loss for search engines. 
Aggarwal et 
al. (2006) 
Search 
Engines 
Advertiser 
Bid Value 
Relevancy 
Proposing a truthful auction mechanism, next-
price auction yields same revenue as truthful 
auction with a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
In next-price auction, there is not a general 
characterization of the Nash equilibrium. 
Aggarwal et 
al. (2007) 
Advertiser Bid Value 
Ad position 
Introduce a position-based auction mechanism, 
which is envy-free, has Nash equilibrium, and 
is bidder optimal. 
Aggarwal et 
al. (2008) 
Search 
Engines 
Advertiser 
Bid Value 
Relevancy 
A model to capture the user behavior and 
designing a slot allocation mechanism 
accordingly to affect the game theory between 
search engine and advertisers. 
Abrams and 
Schwarz 
(2007) 
Search 
Engines 
Bid Value A mechanism for incorporating social welfare 
into search engine performance reducing 
users’ diversion from clicking on sponsored 
results. 
Accounting hidden costs in the sponsored 
search slot allocation increases efficiency for 
search engines. 
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Table A-2: Summary of empirical studies. 
Author(s) Data Methodology Implications  
Ghose and 
Yang 
(2010) 
Six month data of paid 
search advertising 
from a nation-wide 
retail chain 
Hierarchical 
Bayesian modeling 
Consumers searching for a 
product in a category might 
eventually purchase a product 
from different category. 
Retailer-specific keywords 
show more interdependence 
across categories compared to 
brand-specific keywords. 
 
Ghose and 
Yang 
(2008) 
Three month data of 
paid search 
advertising from a 
nation-wide retail 
chain 
Hierarchical 
Bayesian modeling, 
Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo Methods, 
Simulation 
A method for calculating 
optimal bid values. 
Advertisers are either overbid 
or underbid based on their 
keyword characteristics. 
Brand information, rank, and 
keyword length do not have 
any impact on consumers 
spend on the searched 
category. 
Brand information highly 
increases consumer spending 
in another product category 
while rank and keyword length 
do not. 
 
Ghose and 
Yang 
(2009) 
Six month data of paid 
search advertising 
from a nation-wide 
retail chain 
Hierarchical 
Bayesian modeling, 
Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo Methods 
 
Retailer-specific and brand-
specific information in the 
keyword increase CTR while, 
increase in keyword length 
decreases CTR.  
Decrease in ad rank results in 
decrease in both CTR and 
conversion rate. 
Increase in landing page 
quality increases conversion 
rate, while decrease CPC. 
While CTR is higher in 
prominent ad positions, profits 
are not necessarily higher. 
Current bid value has stronger 
effect on ad rank than 
historical CTR. 
 
Yang and 
Ghose 
(2010) 
Three month data of 
paid search 
advertising from a 
nation-wide retail 
Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo Methods 
Modeling the relationship 
between ad rank and keyword 
level attributes and consumer 
responses, advertiser CPC and 
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chain search engine ranking 
mechanism. 
Analyzing nature of 
interdependence between 
sponsored and organic search 
results in terms of consumer 
clicks and advertiser profits. 
Jansen and 
Spink 
(2007) 
Log data from 7 
million interaction of 
users from a major 
meta-search engine 
Classification 
Algorithm, Statistical 
analysis of 
aggregated data 
Classifying search queries as 
informational, navigational, 
and transactional queries. 
Combining sponsored and 
organic links in the same 
listing lowers overall 
sponsored link CTR. 
Navigational queries have 
higher CTR than transactional.  
 
Rey and 
Kannan 
(2010) 
2 month of Yahoo! 
search clicks for 
training and 2 weeks 
of data for testing 
Simple linear 
regression 
A solution for automatically 
adjusting the bid price for 
advanced matched keywords. 
 
Rutz and 
Bucklin 
(2007) 
Three month data of 
paid search campaign 
for a major lodging 
chain from Google 
Binary logit model 
Shrinkage 
procedures 
Ad position, click-through rate, 
and keyword characteristics 
such as brand or location are 
significant predictors of 
conversion rates for keywords. 
Proposing a model to generate 
keywords outperforming 
generic model-free approaches. 
 
Rutz and 
Bucklin 
(2011) 
Daily information on 
paid search campaign 
of a large lodging 
chain on both Google 
and Yahoo! search 
engines. 
Dynamic linear 
model (DLM) 
estimated in a 
Bayesian framework 
Generic keywords have a 
positive significant effect on 
awareness of relevance of 
branded keywords. 
Spillover from generic 
keywords significantly 
influences number of branded 
searches. 
The relationship between 
generic and branded keywords 
is asymmetric. 
 
Ganchev et 
al. (2007) 
Microsoft search 
engine data from 
10000 advertisers 
Logistic Regression 
Model 
Proposing a model to estimate 
CTR values of newly created 
ads. 
30% increase in estimation 
accuracy. 
 
Animesh et 
al. (2011) 
Data for 36 keywords 
with top CTR in 
mortgage industry 
during three month. 
Moderate Multiple 
Regression 
Sponsored search ads are 
targeted to different consumer 
segments. 
Firms differentiation strategy 
strongly moderates the 
relationship between 
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positioning strategy and CTR. 
 
B.  Data Descriptions 
Table A-3: Name, description, and sources of variables. 
Variable Description Source 
Average Ad Rank Where a domain was placed in the order of results. SpyFu 
Organic Rank Shows where a domain places in the standings against all 
other domains when it comes to having the most organic 
results on the most valuable keywords. 
SpyFu 
Estimated Daily 
Budget 
How much a domain spends in PPC each day. This is from 
activity spread out over the month, broken down into daily 
spending. 
SpyFu 
Web Sales (2010) 2010 Internet sales (only online sales channels) Top 500 Guide 
Merchant Type Indicating whether the merchant is web only, retail chain, 
consumer brand manufacturer, or catalog and call center. 
Top 500 Guide 
Min/ Max Average 
CPC 
The minimum and maximum estimated cost per click 
averaged over all the keywords for each domain (monthly) 
SpyFu 
Estimated Total 
Clicks per Day 
the number of clicks a domain receives across all of its paid 
keywords 
SpyFu 
Daily Searches How many times a day do people search for all the keywords 
that a domain is bidding on. 
SpyFu 
PPC Ad Copies Number of the advertisement copies that KeywordSpy 
indexed for each domain 
KeywordSpy 
PPC Keywords Number of PPC keywords being used by each domain. KeywordSpy 
Average Ad 
Competitors 
Reflects the average number of competitors a domain has 
when spread out over its entire paid keyword list (each 
month). 
SpyFu 
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Table A-4: Dispersion of firms over merchant categories and merchant types 
(before cleaning the data) 
Merchandise Category Catalog/  
Call Center 
Consumer  
Brand  
Manufacturer 
Retail 
Chain 
Web 
Only 
Total 
 Apparel/Accessories 20 33 51 24 128 
 Automotive Parts/Accessories 1 0 2 4 7 
 Books/Music/Video 5 0 7 16 28 
 Computers/Electronics 8 10 12 23 53 
 Flowers/Gifts 3 1 3 3 10 
 Food/Drug 6 3 6 6 21 
 Hardware/Home Improvement 2 1 5 13 21 
 Health/Beauty 3 3 6 17 29 
 Housewares/Home Furnishings 10 5 15 17 47 
 Jewelry 1 0 4 10 15 
 Mass Merchant 5 0 14 12 31 
 Office Supplies 2 0 4 12 18 
 Specialty/Non-Apparel 11 0 7 30 48 
 Sporting Goods 3 2 12 10 27 
 Toys/Hobbies 3 2 4 8 17 
Total 83 60 152 205 500 
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C. Methodology Assumptions (February 2012) 
Table A-5: Residual normality tests 
Model&
Kolmogorov,Smirnova& Shapiro,Wilk&
Statistic& D.F.& Sig.& Statistic& D.F.& Sig.&
Model'2' 0.032' 333' .200*' 0.993' 333' 0.146'
Model'3' 0.033' 333' .200*' 0.994' 333' 0.245'
Model'4' 0.036' 333' .200*' 0.996' 333' 0.554'
Model'5' 0.036' 333' .200*' 0.995' 333' 0.297'
Model'6' 0.041' 333' .200*' 0.994' 333' 0.203'
Model'7' 0.035' 333' .200*' 0.994' 333' 0.182'
Model'8' 0.03' 333' .200*' 0.996' 333' 0.663'
*'This'is'a'lower'bound'of'the'true'significance.'
 
Table A-6: Homoscedasticity tests 
Model&
White's&Test& Breusch,Pagan&
Statistic& D.F.& Pr&>&ChiSq& Statistic& D.F.& Pr&>&ChiSq&
Model'1' 9.19' 13' 0.7588' 3.42' 4' 0.49'
Model'2' 55.64' 34' 0.011' 27.92' 7' 0.0002'
Model'3' 46.94' 43' 0.3141' 10.89' 8' 0.2081'
Model'4' 42.14' 52' 0.8338' 14.6' 9' 0.1027'
Model'5' 50.46' 52' 0.5346' 10.61' 9' 0.3031'
Model'6' 47.88' 52' 0.6365' 13.65' 9' 0.1354'
Model'7' 50.02' 52' 0.5521' 10.69' 9' 0.2977'
Model'8' 52.93' 81' 0.9933' 17.66' 12' 0.1265'
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Table A-7: Collinearity among variables (before mean-centering) 
Variable&
Collinearity&Statistics&
Tolerance& VIF&
LogSales' 0.924' 1.082'
LogBudget' 0.551' 1.816'
LogSEO' 0.574' 1.743'
Merchant' 0.881' 1.135'
CPC' 0.731' 1.368'
CTR' 0.874' 1.144'
AdsPerKeyword' 0.832' 1.202'
Competitors' 0.731' 1.368'
 
Table A-8: Collinearity among variables (after mean-centering) 
Variable&
Collinearity&Statistics&
Tolerance& VIF&
LogSales' 0.918' 1.089'
LogBudget' 0.547' 1.827'
LogSEO' 0.572' 1.749'
Merchant' 0.855' 1.17'
CPC' 0.664' 1.507'
CTR' 0.768' 1.301'
AdsPerKeyword' 0.737' 1.358'
Competitors' 0.663' 1.508'
CPC*CTR' 0.661' 1.513'
Competitors*CPC' 0.76' 1.316'
Competitors*CTR' 0.69' 1.449'
Competitors*AdsPerKeyword' 0.799' 1.252'
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Table A-9: Correlation between error terms and independent variables 
Correlations& Unstandardized'Residual'
Unstandardized'Residual' 1'
LogSEO' 0'
LogBudget' 0'
LogSales' 0'
Merchant' 0'
CPC' 0'
CTR' 0'
AdsPerKeyword' 0'
Competitors' 0'
**'Correlation'is'significant'at'the'0.01'level'(2>tailed).'
*'Correlation'is'significant'at'the'0.05'level'(2>tailed).'
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D. March 2012 Results 
 
Table A-10: Means, standard deviations and correlations of key variables (March 2012 data). 
!! Variable! Mean! S.D.! 1! 2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7! 8! 9!
1! Ad!Position! 5.2368! 1.82267! 1.000!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !2! SEO!Quality! 8.2912! 1.47306! C.138**! 1.000!
! ! ! ! ! ! !3! Daily!Budget! 7.3616! 1.35362! C0.004! C.593**! 1.000!
! ! ! ! ! !4! Web!Sales! 17.7152! 1.21538! C0.045! C.203**! .215**! 1.000!
! ! ! ! !5! Merchant!Type! 0.6364! 0.48173! 0.049! C.216**! .202**! .116*! 1.000!
! ! ! !6! CPC! 0.3592! 0.09528! .265**! 0.069! .139**! C0.035! 0.048! 1.000!
! ! !7! CTR! 0.0574! 0.0723! .153**! 0.016! 0.088! C0.091! C.156**! .256**! 1.000!
! !8! Ads!Per!Keyword! 2.2697! 1.00351! C0.028! C0.059! .278**! .106*! .196**! .166**! C0.011! 1.000!
!9! Competition! 7.1697! 1.18094! C.565**! .164**! .107*! C0.028! 0.089! .473**! 0.028! .168**! 1.000!
!
**!Correlation!is!significant!at!the!0.01!level!(2Ctailed).!
! ! ! ! !
!
*!Correlation!is!significant!at!the!0.05!level!(2Ctailed).!
! ! ! ! !
 
 
  
Table A-11: Regression results (March 2012 data) 
 
Dependent'Variable:''
Model'1' Model'2' Model'3' Model'4' Model'5' Model'6' Model'7' Model'8'
Ad'Position'
Intercept' 10.425' 11.24' 7.657' 8.02' 7.541' 7.946' 7.659' 7.936'! (1.854)' (1.809)' (1.078)' (1.039)' (1.081)' (1.061)' (1.079)' (1.029)'
Web'Sales' E0.099' E0.058' E0.086*' E0.098**' E0.085*' E0.095**' E0.087*' E0.101**'! (.082)' (.078)' (.046)' (.044)' (.046)' (.045)' (.046)' (.044)'
Daily'Budget' E0.171*' E0.289***'E0.069' E0.065' E0.064' E0.079' E0.07' E0.061'! (.089)' (.09)' (.054)' (.052)' (.054)' (.053)' (.054)' (.052)'
SEO'Quality' E0.272***'E0.356***'E0.075' E0.088*' E0.074' E0.08*' E0.075' E0.087*'! (.082)' (.08)' (.049)' (.047)' (.049)' (.048)' (.049)' (.046)'
Merchant'Type' 0.133' 0.169' 0.384***' 0.373***' 0.407***' 0.369***' 0.386***' 0.414***'! (.206)' (.201)' (.119)' (.114)' (.12)' (.117)' (.119)' (.114)'
CPC'
'
5.565***' 13.066***'13.768***'12.966***'13.499***'13.101***'13.823***'! ! (1.024)' (.674)' (.66)' (.677)' (.671)' (.676)' (.658)'
CTR'
'
2.663**' 0.493' 2.078**' 0.511' 0.834' 0.485' 2.188***'! ! (1.337)' (.795)' (.818)' (.794)' (.785)' (.795)' (.811)'
Ads'per'Keyword'
'
E0.068' 0.007' 0.019' 0.008' 0.017' E0.002' 0.016'! ! (.098)' (.058)' (.056)' (.058)' (.057)' (.059)' (.056)'
Competition'
' '
E1.365***' E1.386***' E1.356***' E1.431***' E1.36***' E1.397***'! !
'
(.054)' (.052)' (.054)' (.056)' (.054)' (.054)'
CPC*CTR'
' ' '
E42.217***'
' '
E38.903***'!! !!
' '
(7.786)'
' ' '
(8.599)'
Competition*CPC'
' ' ' '
0.509'
' '
1.034***'!! !!
' ' '
(.392)'
' '
(.385)'
Competition*CTR'
' ' ' ' '
E3.438***'
'
E2.106**'!! !!
' ' ' '
(.902)'
'
(.984)'
Competition*'
' ' ' ' ' '
0.04' 0.053'
Ads'per'Keyword'
' ' ' ' ' '
(.05)' (.048)'
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 'RESquared' 0.036' 0.139' 0.7' 0.724' 0.702' 0.712' 0.701' 0.733'
RESquared'Change' 0.036***' 0.103***' 0.561***' 0.024***' 0.002' 0.012***' 0.001' 0.033***'
Number'of'
observations' 352' 352' 352' 352' 352' 352' 352' 352'
Standard'errors'in'parentheses.! ! ! ! ! ! !
***''p<.01'! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
**''''p<.05'! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
*''''''P<.10'! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
